Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 60
pro vyhledávání: '"Rosemarie Nagel"'
Publikováno v:
Scientific Reports, Vol 8, Iss 1, Pp 1-11 (2018)
Abstract Uncertainty in the form of risk or ambiguity can arise from the interaction with nature and other players, while strategic uncertainty arises only in interactions with others. Here, we systematically compare binary decisions between a safe o
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/e39753b584b64e679b91113283817b9f
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 10, Iss 3, p 27 (2019)
In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called ti
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/cb9a93552ac64449b08949ec58834248
Autor:
Giorgio Coricelli, Rosemarie Nagel
Publikováno v:
Revista Internacional de Sociología, Vol 70, Iss Extra_1, Pp 39-52 (2012)
La racionalidad limitada es un fenómeno observado de manera frecuente tanto en juegos experimentales como en situaciones cotidianas. La Neuroeconomía puede mejorar la comprensión de los procesos mentales que caracterizan la racionalidad limitada;
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/c0733334763f4fa7bf3d824f9bd6517f
Autor:
Rosemarie Nagel, Brit Grosskopf
Publikováno v:
The Art of Experimental Economics ISBN: 9781003019121
The ultimatum game is probably the most appraised, simple game with the fiercest debate in the experimental literature about the differences between actual behavior and game-theoretical logic. As a consequence, a large body of literature about behavi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e1937ec3b92928489da9688d6fc62857
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003019121-4
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003019121-4
Publikováno v:
Economics : the Open-Access, Open-Assessment e-Journal, Vol 14, Iss 1 (2020)
The great recession (2008) triggered an apparent discrepancy between empirical findings and macroeconomic models based on rational expectations alone. This gap led to a series of recent developments of a behavioral microfoundation of macroeconomics c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::be921a8538e84186b938557e5fb88eb8
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/45169
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/45169
Publikováno v:
Nature Human Behaviour. 2:925-935
Modern societies offer a large variety of choices1,2, which is generally thought to be valuable3-7. But having too much choice can be detrimental1-3,8-11 if the costs of choice outweigh its benefits due to 'choice overload'12-14. Current explanatory
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 90:191-207
We draw an unusually detailed picture of a discovery, the beauty contest game — with Herve Moulin as the center of the initial inspiration. Since its inception, the beauty contest game and the descriptive level k model has widely contributed to the
Publikováno v:
Strategic Management Journal. 38:2390-2423
Research summary Pursuing sources of entrepreneurial and competitive advantage, researchers have been exploring cognition. We examine how cognitive capabilities affect competitive performance, drawing on two constructs rooted in psychology and econom
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 2019, 167, pp.341-360. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.002⟩
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 2019, 167, pp.341-360. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.002⟩
International audience; We study in a theoretical and experimental setting the interaction between belief-dependent preferences and reputation building in a finitely repeated trust game. We focus mainly on the effect of guilt aversion. In a simple tw
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::87d2c517dbea4a92a78abdd6b6ab4397
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01948364
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01948364
Autor:
Rosemarie Nagel, Dieter Balkenborg
Publikováno v:
German Economic Review. 17:378-408
We report the experimental results on a game with an outside option where forward induction contradicts with backward induction based on a focal, risk dominant equilibrium. The latter procedure yields the equilibrium selected by Harsanyi and Selten