Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 19
pro vyhledávání: '"Ron Peretz"'
Autor:
Ziv Hellman, Ron Peretz
Publikováno v:
Entropy, Vol 22, Iss 2, p 157 (2020)
Entropy plays a significant role in the study of games and economic behaviour in several ways. A decision maker faced with an n-fold repetition of a decision-making problem needs to apply strategies that become increasingly complex as n increases. Wh
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/484b8ffa2fc546f0b9f9b5a00336197c
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 51:293-306
The worst-case Lipschitz constant of an $n$-player $k$-action $\delta$-perturbed game, $\lambda(n,k,\delta)$, is given an explicit probabilistic description. In the case of $k\geq 3$, $\lambda(n,k,\delta)$ is identified with the passage probability o
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1f650a64732002111892210b97ccdbd7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00793-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00793-x
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7d1fb5e3ae96474987efe3bb005408a3
https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538291
https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538291
Autor:
Gilad Bavly, Ron Peretz
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 115:131-145
We study repeated games in which each player i is restricted to (mixtures of) strategies that can recall up to k i stages of history. Characterizing the set of equilibrium payoffs boils down to identifying the individually rational level (“punishme
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b1c8f2127fd6df455de1760151efb825
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.003
We study noise sensitivity of the consensus opinion of the voter model on finite graphs, with respect to noise affecting the initial opinions and noise affecting the dynamics. We prove that the final opinion is stable with respect to small perturbati
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::88de06d586fbe2b4d54d2e41bd3d6400
New ways of doing things often get started through the actions of a few innovators, then diffuse rapidly as more and more people come into contact with prior adopters in their social network. Much of the literature focuses on the speed of diffusion a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1bc7e7bba25feb54c97905f780ccf47d
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102538/
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102538/
Autor:
Ron Peretz, Ziv Hellman
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 108:22-36
We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3a0ec1307467bb3457ac339ace428d86
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.007
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.007
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
New ways of doing things often get started through the actions of a few innovators, then diffuse rapidly as more and more people come into contact with prior adopters in their social network. Much of the literature focuses on the speed of diffusion a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1ceca05c804526ddf3dc1d949cf5b426
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3287726
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3287726
Autor:
Ron Peretz, Gilad Bavly
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 94:157-168
A decision maker observes the evolving state of the world while constantly trying to predict the next state given the history of past states. The ability to benefit from such predictions depends not only on the ability to recognize patters in history
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0f8e42562e1f385b42c7ba51221d9db6
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.006
We define and study a new variant of the secretary problem. Whereas in the classic setting multiple secretaries compete for a single position, we study the case where the secretaries arrive one at a time and are assigned, in an on-line fashion, to on
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::95a5405bfab72a8b2ae6583cfaf91d6e