Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 47
pro vyhledávání: '"Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira"'
Publikováno v:
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy, Vol 22, Iss 1 (2023)
Os lockdowns e as políticas públicas relacionadas à restrição comportamental e econômica, introduzidas em resposta à pandemia de COVID-19, são criticadas com base em três conjuntos de ideias e argumentos organizados de acordo com o provável
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/228cb40d44bf4ebd937f7300c69562c2
Publikováno v:
Humanities & Social Sciences Communications, Vol 9, Iss 1, Pp 1-8 (2022)
Abstract We set forth what one may call a “constitutional reading” in opposition to the traditional widespread “constructivist reading” of the object of cognition. In the light of the so-called one-object view reading of Transcendental ideali
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/9de1fffa57fd4ded8de254ea67df9dfa
Publikováno v:
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Vol 9, Iss 1, Pp 89-125 (2021)
Meu objetivo consiste em desenvolver um modelo teórico alternativo para a cognição direta dos estados elementares de terceiros à chamada Teoria da Interação (doravante TI), também conhecida como abordagem da “segunda pessoa”. O modelo que
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/6d740beaef8e41de81804926570e2999
Publikováno v:
Humanities & Social Sciences Communications, Vol 7, Iss 1, Pp 1-7 (2020)
Abstract This paper presents and defends an alternative version to the so-called strategy of phenomenal concepts (aka PCS) in defense of type B materialism in Jackson’s knowledge argument. Endorsing Ball and Tye’s criticism, I argue in favor of t
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/aaadae8bac7842219d06d4cec4b9b59d
Publikováno v:
Journal of Philosophical Investigations, Vol 14, Iss 32, Pp 252-263 (2020)
In this paper, I argue for a new solution to Mary’s puzzle in Jackson’s famous knowledge argument. We are told that imprisoned Mary knows all facts or truths about color and color vision. On her release, she learns something new according to B-ty
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/51bc3870312048c2b38c1851214bc61c
Publikováno v:
Humanities & Social Sciences Communications, Vol 7, Iss 1, Pp 1-7 (2020)
Abstract How does one know the phenomenal character of one’s own experience? I aim to present and defend a new view of the epistemology of qualia that addresses this issue. My view results from a reworking of Dretske’s displaced perception model.
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/1d403af64799415580b7e366912ab6b8
Publikováno v:
Revista de Filosofia, Vol 24, Iss 34, Pp 129-155 (2012)
O objetivo deste trabalho é rever criticamente algumas interpretações contemporâneas da noção kantiana de intuição sensível. Defendo uma interpretação alternativa segundo a qual a intuição sensível em Kant deva ser entendida nos termos
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/34912c452166466bac59fbca9b63cf1e
Publikováno v:
Princípios, Vol 16, Iss 25, Pp 05-25 (2010)
Esse trabalho apresenta uma reconstruçáo das referidas Deduçáo e Refutaçáo como argumentos contra uma forma empirista de ceticismo questionando a validade de juízos empíricos acerca de objetos externos na chamada acepçáo empírica, náo-tra
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/7f2346622a454409975a403c0c29678f
Publikováno v:
Princípios, Vol 16, Iss 25, Pp 05-25 (2009)
This paper presents a reconstruction of Kant’s Deduction and Kant’s Refutation of Idealism as a form of argument direct against an empiricist form of skepticism questioning the validity of empirical judgments about external object in its so-calle
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/7cf7906c81934bd6a9f1a86a636633a0
Publikováno v:
Grazer Philosophische Studien. 99:379-404
According to Papineau’s qualitative view, experiences instantiate both representational and phenomenal properties. The instantiation of phenomenal properties is people undergoing the relevant experience. In contrast, the instantiation of representa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::843e9b1ee5e4ac7bacefb7148f3f334c
https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000174
https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000174