Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 43
pro vyhledávání: '"Roberto Burguet"'
Autor:
József Sákovics, Roberto Burguet
Publikováno v:
Economic Inquiry. 57:85-102
We present a realistic and novel micro-structure for the market for athletes in league sports. In our trading mechanism the clubs bid for individual players, internalizing the effect that a player not hired might play for the competition. For inelast
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::07871dcb333ef4a395c92442d58d5bc0
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12712
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12712
Publikováno v:
Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
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We review microeconomic research on corruption from the last 30 years. We start by analyzing the seminal models of corruption built on three-tier, delegation models. Then, we go into more detail on the context of corrupt deals, and discuss the main e
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2790a694f5ca3fbae463802dc0eff378
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112789.00024
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112789.00024
Autor:
Jozsef Sakovics, Roberto Burguet
Publikováno v:
Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
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Burguet, R & Sakovics, J 2017, ' Competitive foreclosure ', RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 906-926 . https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12206
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Burguet, R & Sakovics, J 2017, ' Competitive foreclosure ', RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 906-926 . https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12206
We model oligopolistic firms, producing substitutes, who compete for inputs from capacity con- strained suppliers in a decentralized market. Compared to a price-taking input market, the incen- tive to foreclose downstream competitors leads to higher
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6771cd36f2015c06ac93ea08496039df
https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12206
https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12206
Autor:
József Sákovics, Roberto Burguet
Publikováno v:
Burguet, R & Sakovics, J 2017, ' Bertrand and the long run ', International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 51, pp. 39-55 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.005
Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname
Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname
We propose a new model of simultaneous price competition, where firms offer personalized prices to consumers, who then independently decide which offer to accept, if any. Even with decreasing returns to scale, this decentralized market mechanism has
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5f2ec83987eac8aba2db2030e3876c10
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.005
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.005
Autor:
Roberto Burguet, Ramon Caminal
Publikováno v:
Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname
instname
We propose a new solution concept for TU cooperative games in characteristic function form, the SCOOP, which builds on the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) by adding a consistency requirement for negotiations inside every coalition. The SCOOP
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8ed228ef2e1a417034b04a758c91919f
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/216017
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/216017
Autor:
Roberto Burguet, József Sákovics
Publikováno v:
Burguet, R & Sakovics, J 2019, ' Personalized prices and uncertainty in monopsony ', International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 67, 102530, pp. 1-12 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102530
We analyze personalized pricing by a monopsonist facing a finite number of ex ante identical, capacity constrained suppliers with privately known costs. When the distribution of costs is sufficiently smooth and regular, the buyer chooses to make the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b73e8ef96b0472a54f56dd011986b49b
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11820/ce30d1f6-fcef-4d08-b693-1c3dd99cc02b
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11820/ce30d1f6-fcef-4d08-b693-1c3dd99cc02b
Autor:
Ramon Caminal, Roberto Burguet
Publikováno v:
International Economic Review. 56:1019-1041
In this paper we study the optimal ex-ante merger policy in a model where merger proposals are the result of strategic bargaining among alternative candidates. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential syn
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::39c152919b4bc6d3c490612cf9df6f84
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12130
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12130
Autor:
NATALIA FABRA, ANGEL HERNANDO VECIANA, Lourdes Moreno, Andrés Barge-Gil, Simon Anderson, MARCO MARINI, Ramon Fauli-Oller, LUIS CARLOS CORCHON, PAU OLIVELLA, Roberto Burguet, Elena Huergo, Jose G. Montalvo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5494acf7eef9e405c13958ba51271b06
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112789
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112789
Autor:
Roberto Burguet
Publikováno v:
Digital.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC
instname
instname
I investigate the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After contracting with the sponsor, the contractor may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. The mechanism affects whether bribery occurs. I discuss the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::aed7e162364ac7b34045a467ee2a413a
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/167438
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/167438
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 76:15-25
In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bankruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d3971ac8ff09c0aa5350c4b18a285f96
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.04.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.04.004