Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 12
pro vyhledávání: '"Robert A.J. Dur"'
Autor:
Robert A.J. Dur, Coen N. Teulings
We argue that promoting education may be a means to reduceincome inequality. When workers of different skill levels areimperfect substitutes in production, an increase in the level ofhuman capital in the economy reduces the return to education.Hence,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::7f928129c67777b93ebf7b5456534304
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/03024.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/03024.pdf
Autor:
Klaas J. Beniers, Robert A.J. Dur
Trade unions tend to reduce the dispersion of wages among their members. Skilled workers may therefore have an incentive to separate from an encompassing union and organize into a separate craft union. In this paper, we examine a theoretical model to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::02c29b2222499f90dbaa5d1eab50263f
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/03005.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/03005.pdf
Autor:
Josse Delfgaauw, Robert A.J. Dur
This paper examines the consequences of creating a fully competitive market in a sector previously dominated by a cost-minimizing public firm. Workers in the economy are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work in the sector. In line with
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::92b5ddca6b30be9e8f915b7542f546f8
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/02118.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/02118.pdf
Autor:
Robert A.J. Dur, Hein J. Roelfsema
We provide an explanation why centralisation of political decision makingresults in overspending in some policy domains, whereas too low spending persists in others.We study a model in which delegates from jurisdictions bargain over local public good
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::1f29ccbad9783edc1972fe8caeed1bbf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/02056.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/02056.pdf
Autor:
Josse Delfgaauw, Robert A.J. Dur
This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm. We characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::53a89c346ef3478a880353610007433a
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/02050.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/02050.pdf
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The collection of information necessary fordecision-making is often delegated to agents (e.g. bureaucrats,advisors, lawyers). If both the pros and cons of a decision haveto be examined, it is better to use competing agents instead of asingle agent. T
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b0a3bf0e9c91387ed6157cc8d742a11d
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.300582
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.300582
Autor:
Robert A.J. Dur, Coen N. Teulings
Should education be subsidized for the purpose ofredistribution? The usual argument against subsidies to education abovethe primary level is that the rich take up most education, soa subsidy would increase inequality. We show that there is acounterac
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::4ddbad7692c43408cdfe1913ee5e6a23
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/01090.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/01090.pdf
Autor:
Robert A.J. Dur, Otto H. Swank
This paper studies the selection of information collecting agents by policy makers in the light of two agency problems. First, it is often hard to ascertain how much effort agents have put in acquiring information. Second, when agents have an interes
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::97afe361e456608a2ca713a331c5c49a
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/01052.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/01052.pdf
Autor:
Robert A.J. Dur
If distortions in the labour market lead to inefficiently high unemployment, and policy makers cannot enter into a binding policy commitment before nominal wages are set, excessive inflation may result due to a credibility problem. This is the famous
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::3c8f13f6e572a61e6a63a7f14b78f142
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/99051.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/99051.pdf
Autor:
Robert A.J. Dur
This paper offers an explanation for why policy makers stick to inefficient policy decisions. I argue that repealing a policy is a bad signal to voters about the policy maker's competence if voters do not have complete knowledge about the effects of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::808fedcd16afa5427b7484b8b1b360cc
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/99050.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/99050.pdf