Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 29
pro vyhledávání: '"Rietzke, David"'
Autor:
Matros, Alexander1,2 (AUTHOR), Rietzke, David2 (AUTHOR) d.rietzke@lancaster.ac.uk
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. Nov2024, Vol. 78 Issue 3, p815-841. 27p.
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory, 2020 Jun 01. 69(4), 1023-1047.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/45284014
Autor:
Rietzke, David, Chen, Yu
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics, 2020 Apr 01. 51(1), 301-317.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/45380651
Autor:
Rietzke, David Michael
This dissertation is a theoretical exploration of commonly used policy tools meant to improve market performance. The first chapter examines the use of prizes and grants as instruments for encouraging research and development. The second chapter inve
Externí odkaz:
http://hdl.handle.net/10150/318833
Autor:
Gama, Adriana, Rietzke, David
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Theory September 2019 183:823-841
Autor:
Reynolds, Stanley S., Rietzke, David
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory, 2018 Oct 01. 66(3), 707-745.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26705456
Autor:
Rietzke, David, Roberson, Brian
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare, 2013 Apr 01. 40(4), 937-956.
Externí odkaz:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0650-x
Autor:
Gama, Adriana, Rietzke, David Michael
We drive several robust comparative statics results in a contest under minimal restrictions on the primitives. Some of our findings generalize existing results, while others clarify the relevance of structure commonly imposed in the literature. Contr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______201::8ac8448548c5e73cf6daeef5c6838ad9
https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/86554/
https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/86554/
We develop a model of contests on networks. Each player is "connected" to a set of contests, and exerts a single effort to increase the probability of winning each contest to which she is connected. We characterize equilibria under both the Tullock a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______201::79fdef4bb03cf1326d21b3ada64ec200
https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/84925/
https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/84925/
Autor:
Chen, Yu, Rietzke, David Michael
We study a principal-agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We show (1) Performance pay may not be optimal, even if output is the only info
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______201::c7181da0c9f664f86bbd4fbef34a648d
https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/81505/
https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/81505/