Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 20
pro vyhledávání: '"Richard Van Weelden"'
Autor:
Peter Buisseret, Richard Van Weelden
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review: Insights. 4:341-352
We study an election between two office-seeking candidates who are polarized along a partisan issue dimension when one candidate has a valence advantage. The candidates compete by choosing policy on a second issue dimension about which voters’ pref
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::17755df13abd1f33d41f0b5a4eecd2c8
https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210169
https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210169
Autor:
Peter Buisseret, Richard Van Weelden
Publikováno v:
American Journal of Political Science. 64:356-370
We study an elections model in which political parties are internally divided betweenan âeliteâ and a âbaseâ whose preferences are imperfectly aligned. Elites are better informedabout the quality of potential nominees, and their e
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1c0aefe55bbf71149fad2ad5d4aad370
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12457
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12457
Autor:
Richard Van Weelden, Navin Kartik
Publikováno v:
Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 14:131-157
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bc3e1a38e0d6d2ff378a248348527e3c
https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016057
https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00016057
A proposer requires the approval of a veto player to change a status quo. Preferences are single peaked. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer's ideal point. We study Proposer's optimal mechanism without transfers. Vetoer is given a menu, or a delegatio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::183242bc86f72f8187ec68cb78ce0753
Autor:
Richard Van Weelden, Navin Kartik
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 86:755-784
Why do office-motivated politicians sometimes espouse views that are non-congruent with their electorate’s? Can non-congruent statements convey any information about what a politician will do if elected, and if so, why would voters elect a politici
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f05701fa6d2bf2d23e2bc7611cc88a40
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy009
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy009
Publikováno v:
American Journal of Political Science. 61:958-970
We introduce a Downsian model in which policy-relevant information is revealed to the elected politician after the election. The electorate benefits from giving the elected politician discretion to adapt policies to his information. But limits on dis
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f9af5ad5fb4e8f067108e2203248f806
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12310
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12310
Autor:
Richard Van Weelden
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 45:653-686
I consider the welfare implications of polarization in the preferences of political candidates, for different distributions of voter preferences, in a model of repeated elections. Candidates care about policy and also have an opportunity to engage in
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f2b44bbf8d82f6d0092bd31ad17b6138
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0874-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0874-7
Autor:
Richard Van Weelden, Massimo Morelli
Publikováno v:
Journal of Theoretical Politics. 25:412-439
We consider how the incentives for politicians to pander to public opinion depend on preference heterogeneity and information. As there is greater opportunity for voters to update their beliefs about the politician’s type on a more divisive issue,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3942281ae0916566817c9032839cfb4e
https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629812473009
https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629812473009
Autor:
Richard Van Weelden
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Studies. 80(4):1622-1651
I analyze a model of repeated elections in which a representative voter selects among candidates with known policy preferences in each period. In addition to having preferences over policy, the elected candidate would like to use their position to se
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c32a7bda6ef604b854288c776e2c306b
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdt014
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdt014
Autor:
Justin Fox, Richard Van Weelden
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economics. 96:142-150
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::01c9a2c41de3762c90819a11b2d79fea
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.08.007
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.08.007