Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 11
pro vyhledávání: '"Riccardo D. Saulle"'
Publikováno v:
The Economic Journal, 131(637), 2119-2143. Oxford University Press
This paper studies coalition formation among individuals who differ in productivity. The output of a coalition is determined by the sum of the productivities and the size of the coalition. We consider egalitarian societies in which coalitions split t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fe9b1c384d9ecb184c3c832a117b17b4
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/eb97bc52-85a3-415d-887c-533a2e546944
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/eb97bc52-85a3-415d-887c-533a2e546944
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set stability concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capaci
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Rotation programs are widely used in societies. Some examples are job rotations, rotation schemes in the management of common-pool resources, and rotation procedures in fair division problems. We study rotation programs via the implementation of Pare
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We use a controlled laboratory experiment to study the causal impact of income de-creases within a time period on redistribution decisions at the end of that period, in an environment where we keep fixed the sum of incomes over the period. First, we
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences, 106, 36-50. Elsevier
Research on collusion in vertically differentiated markets is conducted under one or two potentially restrictive assumptions. Either there is a single industry-wide cartel or costs are assumed to be independent of quality or quantity. We explore the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::25d894ec30e34784976cc59ff88df051
http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3387930
http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3387930
This paper studies coalition formation among individuals who differ in productivity. The output of a coalition is determined by the sum of the productivities and the size of the coalition. We consider egalitarian societies in which coalitions split t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::294caba4b421fb3ebd6c17f4faf4aaac
https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2020011
https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2020011
Autor:
Riccardo D. Saulle
The thesis is a contribution to Coalition Formation Theory. Coalition formation theory is the collection of disciplines and mathematical tools which deals with the analysis of coalition formation processes. A coalition formation process is a process
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ab012c1700ed77727a3e1008d36e99ff
https://doi.org/10.26481/dis.20190905rs
https://doi.org/10.26481/dis.20190905rs
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision, 87(2), 147-154. Springer, Cham
Theory and decision, 87 (2
Theory and decision, 87 (2
© 2019, The Author(s). We consider a Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous goods and we allow for asymmetric marginal costs. We derive the Myopic Stable Set in pure strategies as introduced by Demuynck et al. (Econometrica 87:111–138, 2019). In contra
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::76485808307deeac638a8a4b00f6c0b9
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/661192
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/661192
Autor:
Marco Marini, Riccardo D. Saulle
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Research on collusion in vertically differentiated markets is conducted under one or two potentially restrictive assumptions. Either there is a single industry-wide cartel or costs are assumed to be independent of quality or quantity. We explore the
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper studies coalition formation among individuals who differ in productivity. The output of a coalition is determined by the sum of productivities if the coalition exceeds a minimal threshold of members. We consider competitive societies in wh