Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 17
pro vyhledávání: '"Ricardo Serrano-Padial"'
Autor:
Ricardo Serrano-Padial
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study large games played by heterogeneous agents whose payoffs depend on the aggregate action and provide novel equilibrium selection and comparative statics results. We prove the equivalence between the global games selection and potential maximi
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 178:153-189
Financial markets crucially rely on the development of an infrastructure dedicated to the enforcement of contracts. Here we study the eects of limited enforcement capacity on nancial contracting by proposing a new theory of costly state verication.
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review. 107:897-930
We investigate the role of information technology (IT) in the collection of delinquent consumer debt. We argue that the widespread adoption of IT by the debt collection industry in the 1990s contributed to the observed expansion of unsecured risky le
Publikováno v:
Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia).
Contract enforceability in financial markets often depends on the aggregate actions of agents. For example, high default rates in credit markets can delay legal enforcement or reduce the value of collateral, incentivizing even more defaults and poten
Autor:
Ricardo Serrano-Padial
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper studies equilibrium selection in large coordination games played by heterogeneous agents, such as models of bank runs, currency attacks or technology adoption. Player payoffs are affected by the average action and the player’s type, as w
Autor:
Amit Gandhi, Ricardo Serrano-Padial
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 82:156-186
This paper studies belief heterogeneity in a benchmark competitive asset market: a market for Arrow-Debreu securities. We show that dierences in agents’ beliefs lead to a systematic pricing pattern, the favorite longshot bias (FLB): securities with
Autor:
Lukasz Drozd, Ricardo Serrano-Padial
Publikováno v:
Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia).
Autor:
Lukasz Drozd, Ricardo Serrano-Padial
Publikováno v:
Working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia).
Autor:
Ricardo Serrano-Padial
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 147:1882-1912
This paper studies pricing patterns in a speculative market with asymmetric information populated by both sophisticated and naive traders. Three pricing regimes arise in equilibrium: perfect pricing, with prices equalling asset values, partial mispri