Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 86
pro vyhledávání: '"Rene van den Brink"'
Publikováno v:
Mathematics, Vol 11, Iss 4, p 980 (2023)
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to every TU-ga
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/13eabf4109d242118fe4528e46eb581c
Publikováno v:
Operations Research and Decisions, Vol vol. 26, Iss no. 2, Pp 107-125 (2016)
It is assumed that relations between n players are represented by a directed graph or digraph. Such a digraph is called invariant if there is a link (arc) between any two players between whom there is also a directed path. We characterize a class of
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/54174aa3960a4bce9e894e647f4d6bd7
Publikováno v:
van den Brink, R, Estevez-Fernandez, A & Wu, H 2022 ' The locally partial permission value for games with a permission structure ' Tinbergen Institute . < https://papers.tinbergen.nl/22037.pdf >
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Cooperative games with a permission structure are useful tools for analyzing the impact of hierarchical structures on allocation problems in Economics and Operations Research. In this paper, we propose a generalization of the local disjunctive and th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::67bdc51e1a1d7e745a065eae8feca977
https://hdl.handle.net/1871.1/124f7868-a62b-4b51-982f-6367279d1a81
https://hdl.handle.net/1871.1/124f7868-a62b-4b51-982f-6367279d1a81
Publikováno v:
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
van den Brink, R, Estevez-Fernandez, A & Wu, H 2022 ' Highway toll allocation ' Tinbergen Institute . < https://papers.tinbergen.nl/22036.pdf >
van den Brink, R, Estevez-Fernandez, A & Wu, H 2022 ' Highway toll allocation ' Tinbergen Institute . < https://papers.tinbergen.nl/22036.pdf >
This paper analyzes the allocation of the total toll collected in a highway among its segments. Based on different toll charging rules, we propose the Segments Equal Sharing method, the Exits Equal Sharing method, and the Entrances Equal Sharing meth
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::679d26b927d27c49ada1338dde7c4c44
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/47bac199-9b7f-4fcc-8b5d-2572c4464820
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/47bac199-9b7f-4fcc-8b5d-2572c4464820
Publikováno v:
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Li, W, Xu, G & van den Brink, R 2021 ' Sign Properties and Axiomatizations of the Weighted Division Values ' TI Discussion Paper Series, II edn, Tinbergen Institute . < https://papers.tinbergen.nl/21104.pdf >
Li, W, Xu, G & van den Brink, R 2021 ' Sign Properties and Axiomatizations of the Weighted Division Values ' TI Discussion Paper Series, II edn, Tinbergen Institute . < https://papers.tinbergen.nl/21104.pdf >
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::0a09dc97816e6479460c2b28a34f5f16
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/5759a7a9-d4e9-459d-a86d-46b02aaf43cb
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/5759a7a9-d4e9-459d-a86d-46b02aaf43cb
Publikováno v:
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Li, W, Xu, G & van den Brink, R 2021 ' Sharing the cost of cleaning up a polluted river ' . < https://www.tinbergen.nl/discussion-paper/6041/21-028-ii-sharing-the-cost-of-cleaning-up-a-polluted-river >
Li, W, Xu, G & van den Brink, R 2021 ' Sharing the cost of cleaning up a polluted river ' . < https://www.tinbergen.nl/discussion-paper/6041/21-028-ii-sharing-the-cost-of-cleaning-up-a-polluted-river >
Consider a group of agents located along a polluted river where every agent must pay a certain cost for cleaning up the polluted river. Following the model of Ni and Wang (2007), we propose the class of alpha-Local Responsibility Sharing methods, whi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::7c5fb6ef286c72e065da4cc5cb397232
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/50f0bf9d-e18e-47f7-8c26-0e77e765212c
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/50f0bf9d-e18e-47f7-8c26-0e77e765212c
Autor:
Encarnacion Algaba, Rene van den Brink
Publikováno v:
Algaba, E & van den Brink, R 2021 ' Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games ' Tinbergen Institute . < https://www.tinbergen.nl/discussion-paper/6032/21-019-ii-networks-communication-and-hierarchy-applications-to-cooperative-games >
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some network structure. Two well-known network structures are hierarchies and communication networks. We give an overview of the most common models of commun
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::42238da613ddd7c26cb8c22b0db0ce4e
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/8aff853e-69d3-44bc-841f-ec6b60566dfd
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/8aff853e-69d3-44bc-841f-ec6b60566dfd
Autor:
Rene van den Brink, Saish Nevrekar
Publikováno v:
van den Brink, R & Nevrekar, S 2020 ' Peaceful Agreements to Share a River ' TI Discussion Paper Series, vol. 20-016/II, II edn, Tinbergen Institute . < https://papers.tinbergen.nl/20016.pdf >
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
This paper develops a model of conflict resolution over scarce water in a trans-boundary river. In our model, we consider countries that are located along a river and made a military investment. Given these investments and their location along the ri
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::d5247bd24787ad5534e0e37fb03dbebc
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/815a12e7-a6e2-4fe4-afcf-1f5b0c53232a
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/815a12e7-a6e2-4fe4-afcf-1f5b0c53232a
Publikováno v:
Zou, Z, van den Brink, R, Chun, Y & Funaki, Y 2019 ' Axiomatizations of the proportional division value ' TI Discussion Paper Series, no. 072/II, vol. 2019, 072/II edn, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam .
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
We present axiomatic characterizations of the proportional division value for TU-games, a value that distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to the stand-alone worths of its members. First, a new proportionality principle, called b
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::0a7b1ba2cbf825f680e8f914d9d94943
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/220021
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/220021