Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 16
pro vyhledávání: '"René Levínský"'
Autor:
Cyril Brom, Tomáš Diviák, Jakub Drbohlav, Václav Korbel, René Levínský, Roman Neruda, Gabriela Kadlecová, Josef Šlerka, Martin Šmíd, Jan Trnka, Petra Vidnerová
Publikováno v:
Scientific Reports, Vol 13, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2023)
Abstract Rotations of schoolchildren were considered as a non-pharmacological intervention in the COVID-19 pandemic. This study investigates the impact of different rotation and testing schedules.We built an agent-based model of interactions among pu
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/768d64f4dd514e5fab66892a5d4908d6
Autor:
Luděk Berec, Tomáš Diviák, Aleš Kuběna, René Levínský, Roman Neruda, Gabriela Suchopárová, Josef Šlerka, Martin Šmíd, Jan Trnka, Vít Tuček, Petra Vidnerová, Milan Zajíček
Publikováno v:
Epidemics, Vol 43, Iss , Pp 100677- (2023)
Background:: Contact tracing is one of the most effective non-pharmaceutical interventions in the COVID-19 pandemic. This study uses a multi-agent model to investigate the impact of four types of contact tracing strategies to prevent the spread of CO
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4e87c435101546efa41773356d6628e2
Autor:
Luděk Berec, René Levínský, Jakub Weiner, Martin Šmíd, Roman Neruda, Petra Vidnerová, Gabriela Suchopárová
Publikováno v:
Scientific Reports, Vol 12, Iss 1, Pp 1-12 (2022)
Abstract Following initial optimism regarding potentially rapid vaccination, delays and shortages in vaccine supplies occurred in many countries during spring 2021. Various strategies to counter this gloomy reality and speed up vaccination have been
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/0333894cecae4714931997e020ee34e8
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 49:1105-1124
In this paper we offer a new, unifying approach to modeling strategies of bounded complexity. In our model, the strategy of a player in a game does not directly map the set H of histories to the set of her actions. Instead, the player’s perception
Autor:
Luděk Berec, René Levínský, Jakub Weiner, Martin Šmíd, Roman Neruda, Petra Vidnerová, Gabriela Suchopárová
Publikováno v:
Scientific reports. 12(1)
Following initial optimism regarding potentially rapid vaccination, delays and shortages in vaccine supplies occurred in many countries during spring 2021. Various strategies to counter this gloomy reality and speed up vaccination have been set forth
Publikováno v:
Journal of Population Economics
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
Elections define representative democracies but also produce spikes in physical mobility if voters need to travel to polling places. In this paper, we examine whether large-scale, in-person elections propagate the spread of COVID-19. We exploit a nat
Publikováno v:
Operations Research Letters, 48(1), 55-60. Elsevier
van den Brink, R, Levínský, R & Zelený, M 2020, ' The Shapley value, the Proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures ', Operations Research Letters, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 55-60 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.11.003
van den Brink, R, Levínský, R & Zelený, M 2020, ' The Shapley value, the Proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures ', Operations Research Letters, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 55-60 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.11.003
In this note, we discuss two solutions for cooperative transferable utility games, namely the Shapley value and the Proper Shapley value. We characterize positive Proper Shapley values by affine invariance and by an axiom that requires proportional a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b91a85a555b5b43faba44e69d5afe14b
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/16df7b51-66db-438a-a363-0171af3601b1
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/16df7b51-66db-438a-a363-0171af3601b1
Publikováno v:
van den Brink, J R, Levinsky, R & Zeleny, M 2015, ' On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games ', International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 449-471 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0439-5
International Journal of Game Theory, 44(2), 449-471. Springer Verlag
International Journal of Game Theory, 44(2), 449-471. Springer Verlag
The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends
Publikováno v:
Journal of Evolutionary Economics. 23:767-781
In a market with stochastic demand with seller competition at most one seller can acquire costly information about demand. Other sellers entertain idiosyncratic beliefs about the market demand and the probability that an informed seller is trading in
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Design
Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research focused on fixed-prize tournaments where the prize to be awarded is set in advance, we introduce ‘output-dependent prizes’ wher
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b56e618382eb4d93d926fb08bb3efb0c
https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0029-D7AE-5
https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0029-D7AE-5