Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 38
pro vyhledávání: '"Raymond Deneckere"'
Autor:
Raymond Deneckere, Sergei Severinov
Publikováno v:
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique. 55:1334-1370
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1e203b1954750e8bd21673b0b94c8473
https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12614
https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12614
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 65:173-220
We introduce bilateral risk aversion into the mixed adverse selection - moral hazard model of Laffont and Tirole (1986). The presence of exogenous risk interacts with the adverse selection problem in interesting ways. In particular, we show that it i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2931cdfa62efc060a70695bb5cf8386b
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.01.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.01.002
Autor:
Chakrabarti, Subir K **I am grateful to C. D. Aliprantis, M. Ali Khan, and T. Parthasarathy for many useful discussions and to Robert Becker and Raymond Deneckere for useful comments. I thank the organizers and the participants of the 20th Annual E.A.R.I.E. Conference, 1993, Tel Aviv, Israel, the Annual South Eastern Economic Theory and Trade Conference, 1993, Duke University and the Midwest Mathematical Economics Conference, October 1995, University of Minnesota in which earlier versions of the paper were presented. I also thank the Department of Economics at the University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign, the Department of Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the Department of Economics at Indiana University-Bloomington, and the NSF workshop on Stochastic Games and Nucleolus, October 1997, at the University of Illinois-Chicago, where the current version of the paper was presented. Since this work was started while the author was visiting the Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University during the academic year 1992–1993, the author thanks that department for its hospitality. Finally, the author thanks two anonymous referees and an Associate Editor for comments that improved the exposition. The usual disclaimer applies.
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Theory April 1999 85(2):294-327
Autor:
Raymond Deneckere, James Peck
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 80:1185-1247
This paper studies a dynamic model of perfectly competitive price posting under demand uncertainty. Firms must produce output in advance. After observing aggregate sales in prior periods, firms post prices for their unsold output. In each period, the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::90ac031a0468b329ffe597656387e90a
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8806
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8806
Autor:
Raymond Deneckere, Sergei Severinov
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 64:487-513
We study implementation in environments where agents have limited ability to imitate others. Agents are randomly and privately endowed with type-dependent sets of messages. So sending a message becomes a partial proof regarding type. For environments
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4d9a51b65aba5d505bc73aa1025ebf7d
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.006
Autor:
Raymond Deneckere, Meng-Yu Liang
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics. 39:1-19
This article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates stochastically over time. We show that there exist three types of stationary equilibria: a Coase Conjecture equilibrium, a monopoly equilibrium, and a re
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d45c490cc769a40971fcb2cf75dd38bc
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00001.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00001.x
Autor:
Sergei Severinov, Raymond Deneckere
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics. 37:816-840
We characterize the optimal screening mechanism for a monopolist facing consumers with privately known demands, some of whom have limited abilities to misrepresent their preferences. We show that consumers with better abilities to misrepresent inform
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::920d4571691012d57a9225ac18154de2
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00059.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00059.x
Autor:
Raymond Deneckere, Meng-Yu Liang
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 74:1309-1364
A seller and a buyer bargain over the terms of trade for an object. The seller receives a perfect signal that determines the value of the object to both players, whereas the buyer remains uninformed. We analyze the infinite-horizon bargaining game in
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::975d0d304d26a3fc1c42f3d296105626
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00706.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00706.x
Publikováno v:
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 111:885-913
We show that a manufacturer facing uncertain demand and selling through a competitive retail market may wish to support adequate retail inventories by preventing the emergence of discount retailers. In our model, discounters offer low prices made pos
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::82a4fe8584d02a8727a5df2ea382b2eb
https://doi.org/10.2307/2946675
https://doi.org/10.2307/2946675
Autor:
Raymond Deneckere, Dan Kovenock
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 8:1-25
This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in a price setting duopoly in which firms have limited capacity, and in which unit costs of production up to capacity may differ. Assuming concave revenue and efficient rationing, we show that the c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::86a505bbe74536bd8fc43f320b561cbc
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212009
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212009