Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 26
pro vyhledávání: '"Rathi, Nidhi"'
Serial dictatorship is a simple mechanism for coordinating agents in solving combinatorial optimization problems according to their preferences. The most representative such problem is one-sided matching, in which a set of n agents have values for a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.04474
Autor:
Akrami, Hannaneh, Rathi, Nidhi
We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible items among agents with (general) monotone valuations. The notion of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is considered to be one of the most fascinating fairness concepts in this
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.14463
We study the classic problem of dividing a collection of indivisible resources in a fair and efficient manner among a set of agents having varied preferences. Pareto optimality is a standard notion of economic efficiency, which states that it should
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.12605
Autor:
Høgsgaard, Mikael Møller, Karras, Panagiotis, Ma, Wenyue, Rathi, Nidhi, Schwiegelshohn, Chris
For the fundamental problem of allocating a set of resources among individuals with varied preferences, the quality of an allocation relates to the degree of fairness and the collective welfare achieved. Unfortunately, in many resource-allocation set
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.03071
We study the classic problem of \emph{fairly} dividing a heterogeneous and divisible resource -- modeled as a line segment $[0,1]$ and typically called as a \emph{cake} -- among $n$ agents. This work considers an interesting variant of the problem wh
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2211.06458
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods among $n$ agents in a fair manner. For this problem, one of the best notions of fairness is envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). However, it is not known if EFX allocations always exist. Hence, s
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2206.01710
We study the classic problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous and divisible resource -- represented by a cake, $[0,1]$ -- among $n$ agents. This work considers an interesting variant of the problem where agents are embedded on a graph. The graphica
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.12559
Autor:
Caragiannis, Ioannis, Rathi, Nidhi
Motivated by the success of the serial dictatorship mechanism in social choice settings, we explore its usefulness in tackling various combinatorial optimization problems. We do so by considering an abstract model, in which a set of agents are asked
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.08097
Autor:
Barman, Siddharth, Rathi, Nidhi
This work develops algorithmic results for the classic cake-cutting problem in which a divisible, heterogeneous resource (modeled as a cake) needs to be partitioned among agents with distinct preferences. We focus on a standard formulation of cake cu
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2006.00481
The classic cake-cutting problem provides a model for addressing fair and efficient allocation of a divisible, heterogeneous resource (metaphorically, the cake) among agents with distinct preferences. Focusing on a standard formulation of cake cuttin
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.11019