Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 65
pro vyhledávání: '"Rann Smorodinsky"'
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 18:15-36
Mean‐preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information design. We introduce the class of bi‐pooling policies, and the class of bi‐pooling distributions as their induced distributions over posteriors. We show that
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::63e6b88f5ba063eda3c7787dcfa37edb
https://doi.org/10.3982/te4663
https://doi.org/10.3982/te4663
Publikováno v:
EC
In this paper we revisit the basic variant of the classical secretary problem. We propose a new approach in which we separate between an agent that evaluates the secretary performance and one that has to make the hiring decision. The evaluating agent
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9c6f636fa081430f011684ed2b529ba9
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.002
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::90a98df8753331598b382428f47a4c0f
https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538292
https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538292
Autor:
Rann Smorodinsky, Ronen Gradwohl
Publikováno v:
Dynamic Games and Applications. 11:759-784
We analyze repeated games in which players have private information about their levels of patience and in which they would like to maintain the privacy of this information vis-a-vis third parties. We show that privacy protection in the form of shield
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9b117c4ed503f727b7a68e0e1dd45b11
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00386-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00386-z
Autor:
Gail Gilboa-Freedman, Rann Smorodinsky
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Computer Science. 841:84-93
Differential privacy is commonly used in the computer science literature as a mathematical definition of privacy for the purpose of quantifying and bounding privacy loss. It induces a preference order over the set of privacy-jeopardizing mechanisms w
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::643d53421faef91ab9750b0d0117b60a
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2020.07.005
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2020.07.005
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 120:16-27
Consider a setting where many individuals forecast the (unknown) state of nature based on signals they receive independently. We refer to the joint distribution over the states and signals as an “information structure.” An information structure i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::240f165242aaef25650a05e82a7fae69
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.006
Autor:
Gail Gilboa-Freedman, Rann Smorodinsky
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 103:59-68
Privacy, in the sense of control over access to one’s personal information, is a central concern in the context of online decision making, both in general and in relation to online platforms in particular. For at least some agents, a belief that on
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::77fb1f573767c450380c0b562ed0be73
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.004
Publikováno v:
Algorithmic Game Theory ISBN: 9783031157134
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::331abd4ffc56cc92ee3cc49c894b37f9
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_21
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_21
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study a monopolist that uses the following scheme to gauge market traction for its common-value, excludible product. The monopolist offers its product at a given price, and each potential consumer decides whether to buy it. The contributions are c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d30cf508fc72bfc36e860ad11bbbfeb1
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4159447
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4159447
Publikováno v:
IJCAI
We study an information-structure design problem (i.e., a Bayesian persuasion problem) in an online scenario. Inspired by the classic gambler's problem, consider a set of candidates who arrive sequentially and are evaluated by one agent (the sender).
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cd43fd34f3cf58e046b6052e7d5d8eba
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/25
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/25