Zobrazeno 1 - 6
of 6
pro vyhledávání: '"Ran Eilat"'
Autor:
Ran Eilat, Kfir Eliaz
Publikováno v:
Journal of the European Economic Association.
We consider the problem faced by a group of players who bargain over what public signal to acquire before deciding on a collective action. The players differ in their privately known state-dependent payoffs from taking the action, and therefore diffe
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cac2e40e2c4dbfa7d8e3a9714eb12c7a
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvac063
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvac063
Autor:
Ran Eilat, Ady Pauzner
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 16:1655-1714
We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c2b4b6e21dae2598ec6b7aef2bd61e9d
https://doi.org/10.3982/te3703
https://doi.org/10.3982/te3703
Autor:
Ran Eilat, Zvika Neeman
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 207:105572
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::229f14c8aa09e25eefaf0416f4692676
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105572
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105572
Modern information technologies make it possible to store, analyze, and trade unprecedented amounts of detailed information about individuals. This has led to public discussions on whether individuals' privacy should be better protected by restrictin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c074d136ec2dbe34452a93cb3804794b
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253537
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253537
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We analyze a model of political competition, in which the uninformed median voter chooses whether to follow or ignore the advice of the elite that forms endogenously to aggregate information. In equilibrium, information transmission is possible only
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::51dad611b9c1c9947aa85d6cf2425301
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3585370
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3585370
Autor:
Ady Pauzner, Ran Eilat
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 71:503-512
We study a private-values buyer–seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::97f97657f12032e0f47152e62c264cf7
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.005
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.04.005