Zobrazeno 1 - 6
of 6
pro vyhledávání: '"Ramon Fauli‐Oller"'
Autor:
Ramon Fauli‐Oller, Joel Sandonís
Publikováno v:
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
We consider a symmetric homogeneous Cournot duopoly operating under increasing marginal costs. One of the firms owns a patented superior technology that reduces the intercept of the marginal cost function. We compare the incentives of the insider pat
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d14561fde5f3ac53f9918a86e8b8f4fe
http://hdl.handle.net/10045/124145
http://hdl.handle.net/10045/124145
Autor:
Ramon Fauli-Oller
Publikováno v:
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
We study a standard duopoly model of simultaneous divisionalization and Cournot competition, assuming that firms have different marginal costs and divisions are costless. We obtain that in equilibrium only the divisions of the efficient firm are acti
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a061d0ec42af3657e5ead9a42b7c19bd
http://hdl.handle.net/10045/123434
http://hdl.handle.net/10045/123434
Autor:
NATALIA FABRA, ANGEL HERNANDO VECIANA, Lourdes Moreno, Andrés Barge-Gil, Simon Anderson, MARCO MARINI, Ramon Fauli-Oller, LUIS CARLOS CORCHON, PAU OLIVELLA, Roberto Burguet, Elena Huergo, Jose G. Montalvo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5494acf7eef9e405c13958ba51271b06
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112789
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112789
Autor:
Ramon Fauli-Oller
Publikováno v:
ResearcherID
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
We consider two symmetric upstream firms producing independent goods that sell to consumers through a common retailer. The distinguishing feature of the retailer is that she has a selling capacity, in the sense, that there is an upper limit in the to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::c737b8da22ccdb70009d7e6f8ca2715f
https://hdl.handle.net/10045/65967
https://hdl.handle.net/10045/65967
Autor:
Ramon Fauli-Oller
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 9:189-210
Horizontal takeovers often occur in waves. A sequence of takeovers is obtained in a Cournotsetting with cost asymmetries. They are motivated by two different reasons: (i) A low realizationof demand increases the profitability of takeovers. (ii) Takeo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::578eb0677f49c88493e3011efa96f864
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00157.x-i1
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00157.x-i1
Autor:
Ramon Fauli-Oller
Publikováno v:
International Game Theory Review. :449-458
In a symmetric setting with constant marginal costs, the welfare loss from mergers depends on the aggregate response of non-participating firms. This response in turn depends on the degree of concavity of the demand. As the degree of concavity of dem
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::fd34fb693b8d7bdd53f096c5dbd7edff
https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919890200080x
https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919890200080x