Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 25
pro vyhledávání: '"Rafael Hortala-Vallve"'
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 12, Iss 3, p 66 (2021)
Using a nationally representative sample of 1052 respondents from the United Kingdom, we systematically tested the associations between the experimental trust game and a range of popular self-reported measures for trust, such as the General Social Su
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/e7f1ee334374447dbf1f8d0849818614
Pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) may increase parties' chances of winning, but they may also distort electoral results and policies away from citizens' preferences. To shed light on how PECs shape post-electoral power distribution, we study the causes
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::75623fcf2b9e60f2b6f23a0404ab9838
https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2021-h9cln-v4
https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2021-h9cln-v4
Autor:
André Blais, Rafael Hortala-Vallve
Publikováno v:
Political Behavior. 43:1395-1409
How do voters react to information about aggregate turnout? Do high turnout levels mobilize or discourage citizens to vote? We argue that it depends on individuals’ degree of conformity. We argue that in addition to the classic calculus of voting,
We evaluate the causes and consequences of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs). In Finland, local elections use open-list PR, and parties may form joint lists. We document that PECs are more common between parties of equal size and similar ideology, and
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::11d8b2fc1011f757f8392a235c739844
https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2021-h9cln-v2
https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2021-h9cln-v2
We evaluate the causes and consequences of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs). In Finland, local elections use a proportional representation system with open lists, and parties may form joint lists. We document that PECs are more common between parties
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9b2741e98eddde826e711061d13ff5a0
https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2021-h9cln
https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2021-h9cln
Autor:
Santiago González, Louis Putterman, Gianluca Grimalda, Yann Algan, Conal Smith, Vincent Siegerink, Soonhee Kim, Rafael Hortala Vallve, Romina Boarini, Lara Fleischer, Arnstein Aassve, Fabrice Murtin, David Lee, Zsuzsanna Lonti
Publikováno v:
OECD Statistics Working Papers
This paper describes the results of an international initiative on trust (Trustlab) run in six OECD countries between November 2016 and November 2017 (France, Germany, Italy, Korea, Slovenia and the United States). Trustlab combines cutting-edge tech
Is there more sincere voting in multi-member districts than in single-member districts? Existing research on this question is inconclusive, at least in part because it is difficult with observational data to isolate the effect of district magnitude o
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::488724a1930ae8f76c27fe3cebdc3195
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67506/
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67506/
Autor:
Rafael Hortala-Vallve
It has recently been shown that by linking collective decisions the incentive costs can become negligible and, at the limit, ex ante efficiency can be achieved. In a voting situation this implies that the agents’ intensity of preferences can be tak
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7f29d778209b0f579904a8ccf5ffc836
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:75c37d06-5407-4377-a558-3cdbaba19295
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:75c37d06-5407-4377-a558-3cdbaba19295
Autor:
André Blais, Rafael Hortala-Vallve
Publikováno v:
Voting Experiments ISBN: 9783319405711
We design an experiment testing whether subjects’ reaction to aggregate turnout are consistent with rational calculations (more inclined to vote when presented with information that turnout is low, and to abstain when informed that turnout is high)
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2b232dfe1f40ff637080d57b136197e5
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40573-5_6
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40573-5_6
Autor:
Rafael Hortala-Vallve
Publikováno v:
Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 6:179-196
Legislators trade influence to attain the approval of their most preferred bills. A classic example can be found in pork barrel politics with concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, in which logrolling agreements can load costs onto legislators excl