Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 10
pro vyhledávání: '"Rafael Graebin Vogelmann"'
Autor:
Rafael Graebin Vogelmann
Publikováno v:
Filosofia Unisinos, Vol 25, Iss 3 (2024)
Some of our reasons for acting are grounded precisely on the fact that we are not fully virtuous agents. This shows that the intuitive view that what we should do is what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances we find ourselves is false. Man
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/1bf1d5cb2ea94655acd4450f0de6f2d0
Autor:
Rafael Graebin Vogelmann
Publikováno v:
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy, Vol 22, Iss 1 (2023)
Non-naturalists about the normative face the problem of providing a metaphysical explanation for the supervenience of the normative on the natural. Recently, Gideon Rosen has argued that non-naturalists can side-step this problem by rejecting strong
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/34868dce25d341be92f9c9c3a6b39224
Autor:
Rafael Graebin Vogelmann
Publikováno v:
Revista de Filosofia, Vol 35 (2023)
We conceive of ourselves as capable of acting in response to normative reasons. Given that normative reasons are facts, this self-conception entails that we are capable of acting in response to facts. Arguments from error cases might seem to force us
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/9567327fe8a2472aabcfc25cb6c87667
Autor:
Rafael Graebin Vogelmann
Publikováno v:
Kriterion, Vol 61, Iss 146, Pp 523-544 (2020)
ABSTRACT It is commonly held that the goals at which an action aims are specified by the pro-attitude/belief pairs in light of which the action seems appealing to the agent. I argue that the existence of multiple-incentives cases (i.e., cases in whic
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/284795d7d32d4522a275ebdfe22a9255
Autor:
Rafael Graebin Vogelmann
Publikováno v:
Filosofia Unisinos, Vol 20, Iss 3 (2019)
Em seu “Argumentos de superveniência contra o realismo moral robusto”, Wilson Mendonça defende o realismo moral robusto (a tese de que propriedades morais não são idênticas a propriedades naturais) do Argumento Explanatório a partir da Supe
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/49b8dd3511764ce5a081c4fc45e86916
Autor:
Rafael Graebin Vogelmann
Publikováno v:
Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã, Vol 24, Iss 1 (2019)
Kant has often been accused of being a phenomenalist, i.e., of reducing spatial objects to representations that exist only in our minds. I argue against this reading. Given Kant’s claim that appearances are mere representations, the only way to avo
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/cb295e14ee044bb9a76ab340ac287033
Autor:
Rafael Graebin Vogelmann
Publikováno v:
The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 59:230-248
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f2a1781433935abe88a15a484ff35c02
https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12403
https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12403
Autor:
Rafael Graebin Vogelmann
Publikováno v:
Analytica - Revista de Filosofia. 22:84-113
Neste artigo considero e rejeito uma leitura não-cognitivista do sentimentalismo moral de Hume (segundo a qual ele identifica convicções morais com impressões de um tipo particular) bem como uma leitura disposicionalista (segundo a qual Hume
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::646565d0fdd897b9ac72355030e59788
https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22i2.84-113
https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22i2.84-113
Autor:
Rafael Graebin Vogelmann
Publikováno v:
Manuscrito, Vol 40, Iss 3, Pp 1-27
Manuscrito, Volume: 40, Issue: 3, Pages: 1-27, Published: SEP 2017
Manuscrito v.40 n.3 2017
Manuscrito
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
Manuscrito, Volume: 40, Issue: 3, Pages: 1-27, Published: SEP 2017
Manuscrito v.40 n.3 2017
Manuscrito
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
Moral Naturalism is the view that moral judgments aim at describing moral facts and that these are ordinary garden-variety natural facts. Moral Naturalism has trouble accounting for the intuition that we cannot outsource moral judgments, i.e., we can
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a3643170bdc5170d79b4f1de9d850a1a
https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n3.rv
https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n3.rv
Autor:
Rafael Graebin Vogelmann
Publikováno v:
Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em Filosofia. 9
O principal objetivo deste texto é argumentar em prol da alegação de McDowell de que temos uma obrigação perpétua de refletir sobre o ajuste entre nossa visão de mundo e a realidade. Esta obrigação está atrelada à recusa da possibilidade d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ac6cbac88264b339ea3f1d76bac53383
https://doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2017.v9n20.14.p223
https://doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2017.v9n20.14.p223