Robust ethical realism, necessary truths and the miracle of morality

Autor: Rafael Graebin Vogelmann

Publikováno v: Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy, Vol 22, Iss 1 (2023)

Non-naturalists about the normative face the problem of providing a metaphysical explanation for the supervenience of the normative on the natural. Recently, Gideon Rosen has argued that non-naturalists can side-step this problem by rejecting strong

Externí odkaz: https://doaj.org/article/34868dce25d341be92f9c9c3a6b39224

WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?

Autor: Rafael Graebin Vogelmann

Publikováno v: Kriterion, Vol 61, Iss 146, Pp 523-544 (2020)

ABSTRACT It is commonly held that the goals at which an action aims are specified by the pro-attitude/belief pairs in light of which the action seems appealing to the agent. I argue that the existence of multiple-incentives cases (i.e., cases in whic

Externí odkaz: https://doaj.org/article/284795d7d32d4522a275ebdfe22a9255

Representation and Phenomenalism in the Critique of Pure Reason

Autor: Rafael Graebin Vogelmann

Publikováno v: Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã, Vol 24, Iss 1 (2019)

Kant has often been accused of being a phenomenalist, i.e., of reducing spatial objects to representations that exist only in our minds. I argue against this reading. Given Kant’s claim that appearances are mere representations, the only way to avo

Externí odkaz: https://doaj.org/article/cb295e14ee044bb9a76ab340ac287033

Hume as an Error Theorist

Autor: Rafael Graebin Vogelmann

Publikováno v: Analytica - Revista de Filosofia. 22:84-113

Neste artigo considero e rejeito uma leitura não-cognitivista do sentimentalismo moral de Hume (segundo a qual ele identifica convicções morais com impressões de um tipo particular) bem como uma leitura disposicionalista (segundo a qual Hume

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::646565d0fdd897b9ac72355030e59788
https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22i2.84-113

A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments

Autor: Rafael Graebin Vogelmann

Publikováno v: Manuscrito, Vol 40, Iss 3, Pp 1-27
Manuscrito, Volume: 40, Issue: 3, Pages: 1-27, Published: SEP 2017
Manuscrito v.40 n.3 2017
Manuscrito
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP

Moral Naturalism is the view that moral judgments aim at describing moral facts and that these are ordinary garden-variety natural facts. Moral Naturalism has trouble accounting for the intuition that we cannot outsource moral judgments, i.e., we can

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a3643170bdc5170d79b4f1de9d850a1a
https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n3.rv