Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 30
pro vyhledávání: '"Quoc Huy Do"'
Publikováno v:
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP).
Autor:
Quoc Huy Do, Guido Schmitz, Abhishek Bichhawat, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Pedram Hosseyni, Tim Würtele, Ralf Küsters
Publikováno v:
CCS '21: 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
CCS '21: 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Nov 2021, Virtual Event, South Korea. pp.2601-2617, ⟨10.1145/3460120.3484588⟩
CCS
CCS '21: 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Nov 2021, Virtual Event, South Korea. pp.2601-2617, ⟨10.1145/3460120.3484588⟩
CCS
The ACME certificate issuance and management protocol, standardized as IETF RFC 8555, is an essential element of the web public key infrastructure (PKI). It has been used by Let's Encrypt and other certification authorities to issue over a billion ce
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7106bdbd0cba63800f37ccbc276ba101
https://inria.hal.science/hal-03540403
https://inria.hal.science/hal-03540403
Autor:
Quoc Huy Do, Abhishek Bichhawat, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Guido Schmitz, Ralf Küsters, Pedram Hosseyni, Tim Würtele
Publikováno v:
2021 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P).
We present $\text{DY}^{\star}$ , a new formal verification framework for the symbolic security analysis of cryptographic protocol code written in the $\mathrm{F}^{\star}$ programming language. Unlike automated symbolic provers, our framework accounts
Autor:
Ralf Küsters, Quoc Huy Do, Tim Würtele, Guido Schmitz, Pedram Hosseyni, Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Abhishek Bichhawat
Publikováno v:
Protocols, Strands, and Logic ISBN: 9783030916305
Protocols, Strands, and Logic
Daniel Dougherty; José Meseguer; Sebastian Alexander Mödersheim; Paul Rowe. Protocols, Strands, and Logic, 13066, Springer International Publishing, pp.77-97, 2021, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-91631-2_4⟩
Protocols, Strands, and Logic
Daniel Dougherty; José Meseguer; Sebastian Alexander Mödersheim; Paul Rowe. Protocols, Strands, and Logic, 13066, Springer International Publishing, pp.77-97, 2021, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-91631-2_4⟩
\(\textsf {DY}^\star \) is a recently proposed formal verification framework for the symbolic security analysis of cryptographic protocol code written in the \(\textsf {F}^\star \) programming language. Unlike automated symbolic provers, \(\textsf {D
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c9a3ee19294d8e02a7f29ad4f772cb0e
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91631-2_4
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91631-2_4
Publikováno v:
Computers & Security. 67:335-349
We present a method to generate automatically exploits for information flow leaks in object-oriented programs. The goal, similar to white-box test generation, is to automatically produce executable, reusable test cases that challenge a given informat
Publikováno v:
IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Magazine. 9:42-56
Lane change maneuver is a complicated maneuver, and incorrect maneuvering is an important reason for expressway accidents and fatalities. In this scenario, automated lane change has great potential to reduce the number of accidents. Previous research
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Aspects of Computing – ICTAC 2017 ISBN: 9783319677286
ICTAC
ICTAC
A program has secure information flow if it does not leak any secret information to publicly observable output. A large number of static and dynamic analyses have been devised to check programs for secure information flow. In this paper, we present a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cd2e750e9372184d5b635cc18fd0141b
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67729-3_16
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67729-3_16
Publikováno v:
Journal of the Japan Society for Precision Engineering. 80:308-315
Publikováno v:
The Proceedings of the Transportation and Logistics Conference. :289-292