Zobrazeno 1 - 9
of 9
pro vyhledávání: '"Qingning Cao"'
Publikováno v:
Production and Operations Management. 31:1679-1697
Publikováno v:
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems. 50:4472-4481
This paper considers two firms that compete on both advertising and pricing. Each firm decides whether to use mass advertising to cover the entire market or adopt targeted advertising to inform only the switching shoppers. We capture this problem thr
Autor:
Ce Li, Zhe Guo, Chengzhi Cai, Junyi Miao, Xiaoyu Cao, Cong Li, Yefei Guo, Qingning Cao, Zifei Zheng, Yuchen Guo, Wanling Wu, Zhiyan Xu, Xinyan Zhou
Publikováno v:
CAADRIA proceedings.
Autor:
Qingning Cao, Jianqiang Zhang
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Production Research. 58:308-331
Gray market occurs when a product is diverted from a market to another without the authorisation of the manufacturer. Conventional wisdom believes that (a) the manufacturer should increase product ...
Publikováno v:
Annals of Operations Research.
Online platforms provide sellers’ products on their websites and earn a commission fee for each unit sold. Recently, many platforms have tried to refer customers to their direct competitors. In this paper, we explain this counter-intuitive practice
Publikováno v:
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review. 157:102552
Publikováno v:
Omega. 91:102013
This paper studies manufacturer encroachment in a supply chain wherein the manufacturer and/or the retailer should invest in informative advertising. Using a game-theoretic framework, we explore three schemes of advertising and their influences on ma
Publikováno v:
Production and Operations Management. 24:1931-1944
type="main" xml:id="poms12388-abs-0001"> A firm's two-product bundling decision is examined when the supply of one product is limited and consumer valuations are normally distSteckeributed. The firm can choose to sell products separately and/or throu
Publikováno v:
Journal of Retailing. 91:50-67
We study retailer bundling in a distribution channel when the manufacturer for one bundled product can strategically set the wholesale price. We show that the retailer can use a bundling option as a strategic leverage to extract concessions from the