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pro vyhledávání: '"Preston J Werner"'
Autor:
Preston J. Werner
Publikováno v:
Philosophies, Vol 8, Iss 3, p 49 (2023)
According to contentful moral perception (CMP), moral properties can be perceived in the same sense as tables, tigers, and tomatoes. Recently, Heather Logue (2012) has distinguished between two potential ways of perceiving a property. A Kantian Prope
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/e6ea636f9c6943c682e94e492e000af4
Autor:
Bar Luzon, Preston J Werner
Publikováno v:
Analysis. 82:435-444
Naive realism in philosophy of perception is the view that (factive) perception involves a direct relation between perceiving subjects and the world. The naive realist says that your perception of a cat on the mat is a worldly relation that is partia
Autor:
Jonna Vance, Preston J. Werner
Publikováno v:
Journal of Moral Philosophy. 19:501-525
Moral perceptualism is the view that perceptual experience is attuned to pick up on moral features in our environment, just as it is attuned to pick up on mundane features of an environment like textures, shapes, colors, pitches, and timbres. One imp
Autor:
Preston J. Werner
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 179:2259-2283
Autor:
Preston J. Werner
Publikováno v:
Journal of Moral Philosophy. 17:290-319
Moral perception has made something of a comeback in recent work on moral epistemology. Many traditional objections to the view have been argued to fail upon closer inspection. But it remains an open question just how far moral perception might exten
Autor:
Teresa Bruno-Niño, Preston J. Werner
Publikováno v:
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 97:690-700
Most of us spend a significant portion of our lives learning, practising, and performing a wide range of skills. Many of us also have a great amount of control over which skills we learn and develo...
Autor:
Preston J. Werner
Publikováno v:
Normativity and the Problem of Representation ISBN: 9780429331169
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e7f586cf9ccb39304031483c1a134d5f
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429331169-15
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429331169-15
Autor:
Preston J. Werner
Publikováno v:
Philosophy Compass. 15
Autor:
Preston J. Werner
Publikováno v:
Journal of Moral Philosophy. 15:164-181
Proponents of impure moral perception claim that, while there are perceptual moral experiences, these experiences epistemically depend on a priori moral knowledge. Proponents of pure moral perception claim that moral experiences can justify independe
Autor:
Preston J. Werner
Publikováno v:
Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 48:616-637
Non-naturalist normative realists face an epistemological objection: They must explain how their preferred route of justification ensures a non-accidental connection between justified moral beliefs and the normative truths. One strategy for meeting t