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pro vyhledávání: '"Preference list"'
Akademický článek
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Publikováno v:
Discrete Applied Mathematics. 308:220-234
We study the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Projects ( spa-p ). In this context it is known that stable matchings can have different sizes and the problem of finding a maximum size stable matching is NP-hard. There
Autor:
Chi-Kit Lam, C. Gregory Plaxton
Publikováno v:
Theory of Computing Systems. 66:679-695
We study the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. This model involves three types of agents, with an equal number of agents of each type. The types form a cyclic order such that each agent has a complete preference list
Publikováno v:
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization. 43:98-115
We address a general housing market problem with a set of agents and a set of houses. Each agent has a weak ordinal preference list that allows ties on houses as well as an initial endowment; moreover, each agent wishes to reallocate to a better hous
Publikováno v:
J Appl Stat
We present a framework based on a higher education application preference list that allows a different type of flexible aggregation and, hence, the analysis and clustering of application data. Preference lists are converted into scores. The proposed
Publikováno v:
Expert Systems with Applications. 187
In the Tutor Allocation Problem, the objective is to assign a set of tutors to a set of workshops in order to maximize tutors' preferences. The problem is solved every year by many universities, each having its own specific set of constraints. In thi
Publikováno v:
WALCOM: Algorithms and Computation ISBN: 9783319751719
WALCOM
WALCOM
Given a set $A$ of $n$ people and a set $B$ of $m \geq n$ items, with each person having a list that ranks his/her preferred items in order of preference, we want to match every person with a unique item. A matching $M$ is called popular if for any o
Autor:
Josue Ortega
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 174:48-51
Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the
Conference
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Autor:
Boris Pittel
For a two-sided ( n men/ n women) stable matching problem) Gale and Shapley studied a proposal algorithm (men propose/women select, or the other way around), that determines a matching, not blocked by any unmatched pair. Irving used this algorithm as
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a48042327c9370fe2f092bee3ca243ad
http://arxiv.org/abs/2005.06691
http://arxiv.org/abs/2005.06691