Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 112
pro vyhledávání: '"Pradelski, Bary"'
Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that aligning the agents' preferences with the system-level objective--altrui
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.01525
Autor:
Pradelski, Bary S. R., Tarbush, Bassel
In a $\textit{satisficing equilibrium}$ each agent plays one of their $k$ best pure actions, but not necessarily their best action. We show that satisficing equilibria in which agents play only their best or second-best action exist in almost all gam
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.00832
In view of the complexity of the dynamics of learning in games, we seek to decompose a game into simpler components where the dynamics' long-run behavior is well understood. A natural starting point for this is Helmholtz's theorem, which decomposes a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07224
We initiate the study of how auction design affects the division of surplus among buyers. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to the family of standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our surplus-equitable mechanism is efficient
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.07799
The control of large-scale, multi-agent systems often entails distributing decision-making across the system components. However, with advances in communication and computation technologies, we can consider new collaborative decision-making paradigms
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2311.01379
The emergence of new communication technologies allows us to expand our understanding of distributed control and consider collaborative decision-making paradigms. With collaborative algorithms, certain local decision-making entities (or agents) are e
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2308.08045
In selection processes such as hiring, promotion, and college admissions, implicit bias toward socially-salient attributes such as race, gender, or sexual orientation of candidates is known to produce persistent inequality and reduce aggregate utilit
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2202.01661
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Mathematical Economics June 2024 112
We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over time and are drawn from a continuum of types. The cost of matching a client and provider varies, so a social planner is faced with two contending objectives: a) to reduce players'
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2001.00468