Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 23
pro vyhledávání: '"Pooya Molavi"'
This paper analyzes how limits to the complexity of statistical models used by market participants can shape asset prices. We consider an economy in which agents can only entertain models with at most k factors, where k may be distinct from the true
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4585d9c0d93f2b262f3984d04f14f663
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28408
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28408
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9f2ba62530844b09b52d4cffed3d0288
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3776977
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3776977
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 86:445-490
This paper studies the behavioral foundations of non‐Bayesian models of learning over social networks and develops a taxonomy of conditions for information aggregation in a general framework. As our main behavioral assumption, we postulate that age
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0f676c4ce56028515b11958074c3adfb
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14613
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta14613
Publikováno v:
IEEE Signal Processing Magazine. 30:30-42
The role of social networks in learning and opinion formation has been demonstrated in a variety of scenarios such as the dynamics of technology adoption [1], consumption behavior [2], organizational behavior [3], and financial markets [4]. The emerg
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2aa4d1b8f1ac39729953050fb080e86b
https://doi.org/10.1109/msp.2012.2235194
https://doi.org/10.1109/msp.2012.2235194
Publikováno v:
IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing. 7:358-369
This paper focuses on a model of opinion formation over networks with continuously flowing new information and studies the relationship between the network and information structures and agents' ability to reach agreement. At each time period, agents
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4f21b2b733c02cdad42f539dc9ed8e18
https://doi.org/10.1109/jstsp.2013.2246764
https://doi.org/10.1109/jstsp.2013.2246764
Autor:
Pooya Molavi
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In this paper I propose an equilibrium search and matching model with worker heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and endogenous separations, and argue that it can help our understanding of the U.S. labor market experience following the Great Reces
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7538d6caa0d1107732906a27313b00e8
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2799790
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2799790
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In this paper, we study the problem of non-Bayesian learning over social networks by taking an axiomatic approach. As our main behavioral assumption, we postulate that agents follow social learning rules that satisfy imperfect recall, according to wh
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cb42bfa0f59c522e85c00c82b87a4e5f
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2683607
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2683607
Publikováno v:
CDC
This work is concerned with the problem of social learning. A network of agents attempt to learn some unknown state of the world which is drawn by nature from a finite set. The sources of information available to the agents are their own private obse
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::60724a0bd118fd37251529be425ec076
https://doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2014.7040286
https://doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2014.7040286
Publikováno v:
ICASSP
We consider a repeated game in which a team of agents share a common, but only partially known, task. The team also has the goal to coordinate while completing the task. This creates a trade-off between estimating the task and coordinating with other
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9ebc09ec05917a7d8e5a75cb22a03ac1
https://doi.org/10.1109/icassp.2014.6854510
https://doi.org/10.1109/icassp.2014.6854510
Publikováno v:
CDC
We study a dynamic game in which a group of players attempt to coordinate on a desired, but only partially known, outcome. The desired outcome is represented by an unknown state of the world. Agents' stage payoffs are represented by a quadratic utili
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::da62f18cd15f913b3c9586b62de3248d
https://doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2013.6761057
https://doi.org/10.1109/cdc.2013.6761057