Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 79
pro vyhledávání: '"Pieter A. Gautier"'
Publikováno v:
De Haan, M, Gautier, P A, Oosterbeek, H & van der Klaauw, B 2023, ' The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice ', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 131, no. 2, pp. 388-455 . https://doi.org/10.1086/721230
Journal of Political Economy, 131(2), 388-455. University of Chicago
Journal of Political Economy, 131(2), 388-455. University of Chicago
Theory points to a potential trade-off between two main school assignment mechanisms; Boston and Deferred Acceptance (DA). While DA is strategy-proof and gives a stable matching, Boston might outperform DA in terms of ex-ante efficiency. We quantify
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ea02961600f21f8fe998c31038020cb6
https://hdl.handle.net/1871.1/f6304028-82f7-4f2b-b6c6-4164d6c82f0b
https://hdl.handle.net/1871.1/f6304028-82f7-4f2b-b6c6-4164d6c82f0b
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory, 190:105121, 1-39. Academic Press Inc.
Albrecht, J, Cai, X, Gautier, P & Vroman, S 2020, ' Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power ', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 190, 105121, pp. 1-39 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105121
Albrecht, J, Cai, X, Gautier, P & Vroman, S 2020, ' Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power ', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 190, 105121, pp. 1-39 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105121
We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1f947e13dcdf6a2c77e4f6f426506cb5
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/e1030749-03b1-41e9-9f2c-d515079066ad
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/e1030749-03b1-41e9-9f2c-d515079066ad
Autor:
Aico van Vuuren, Pieter A. Gautier
Publikováno v:
The Econometrics Journal. 23:363-385
Summary What can contracts—traded and priced in a competitive market and featuring a pre-specified system of future payments—teach us about time preferences and present bias? We first show that identification of present bias requires assumptions
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::469b3deb6cd08fd71848b0227a1d5b54
https://doi.org/10.1093/ectj/utaa018
https://doi.org/10.1093/ectj/utaa018
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The literature offers two foundations for competitive search equilibrium, a Nash approach and a market-maker approach. When each buyer visits only one seller (or each worker makes only one job application), the two approaches are equivalent. However,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::92cd70aa06352d4cbc6273c1751a082e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3879966
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3879966
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We investigate the effect of search frictions on labor market sorting by constructing a model which is in line with recent evidence that employers collect a pool of applicants before interviewing a subset of them. In this environment, we derive the n
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::be2f61d22b414735f4117e1e3f3c85ae
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3875620
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3875620
Publikováno v:
Labour Economics, 50(S1), 80-86. ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Labour Economics, 50, 80-86. Elsevier
Gautier, P A & Moraga-González, J L 2018, ' Search intensity, wage dispersion and the minimum wage ', Labour Economics, vol. 50, pp. 80-86 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2017.04.003
Labour Economics, 50, 80-86. Elsevier
Gautier, P A & Moraga-González, J L 2018, ' Search intensity, wage dispersion and the minimum wage ', Labour Economics, vol. 50, pp. 80-86 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2017.04.003
We study a labor market where employers post wages and workers simultaneously choose the number of applications they send out. Firms offer the job to a worker at random; workers with multiple offers pick the best one. If the application costs are suf
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::adeb8360ac828dccd2cb8b6df2e121e3
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85018422445&partnerID=8YFLogxK
http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85018422445&partnerID=8YFLogxK
Autor:
Christian Holzner, Pieter A. Gautier
Publikováno v:
Gautier, P A & Holzner, C L 2017, ' Simultaneous search and efficiency of entry and search intensity ', American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 245-282 . https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160088
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9(3), 245-282. American Economic Association
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9(3), 245-282. American Economic Association
We consider a model where firms open vacancies and post and commit to a wage mechanism. Search is costly and workers simultaneously apply to multiple jobs. Firms can be connected to multiple workers and workers to multiple firms. We use a new method
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ff3d2016cf7fa424f826fc7d6bd5a34b
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160088
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160088
Publikováno v:
International Economic Review. 57:787-826
We show empirically that high-risk sectors, which contribute strongly to aggregate productivity growth, are relatively small and have relatively low productivity growth in countries with strict employment protection legislation (EPL). To understand t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::98784d935554e3ef905ee8b0c0b71a7b
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12176
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12176
Publikováno v:
European Economic Review, 84, 123-139. ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
European Economic Review, 84(May), 123-139. Elsevier
Gautier, P A, Moraga Gonzalez, J L & Wolthoff, R P 2016, ' Search Costs and Efficiency: Do Unemployed Workers Search Enough? ', European Economic Review, vol. 84, no. May, pp. 123-139 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.04.001
European Economic Review, 84(May), 123-139. Elsevier
Gautier, P A, Moraga Gonzalez, J L & Wolthoff, R P 2016, ' Search Costs and Efficiency: Do Unemployed Workers Search Enough? ', European Economic Review, vol. 84, no. May, pp. 123-139 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.04.001
Many labor market policies affect the marginal benefits and costs of job search. The impact and desirability of such policies depend on the distribution of search costs. In this paper, we provide an equilibrium framework for identifying the distribut
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::98016c47194956c1d4a5f7f37019726b
https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/50967890-ff02-457a-879e-9221b8fbeb13
https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/50967890-ff02-457a-879e-9221b8fbeb13
Publikováno v:
Journal of Labor Economics, 36(4), 1073-1125. University of Chicago
Aarhus University
Muller, P, van der Klaauw, B, Gautier, P A, Rosholm, M & Svarer, M 2018, ' Estimating equilibrium effects of job search assistance ', Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 1073-1125 . https://doi.org/10.1086/697513
Gautier, P, Muller, P, van der Klaauw, B, Rosholm, M & Svarer, M 2018, ' Estimating equilibrium effects of job search assistance ', Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 1073-1125 . https://doi.org/10.1086/697513
Aarhus University
Muller, P, van der Klaauw, B, Gautier, P A, Rosholm, M & Svarer, M 2018, ' Estimating equilibrium effects of job search assistance ', Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 1073-1125 . https://doi.org/10.1086/697513
Gautier, P, Muller, P, van der Klaauw, B, Rosholm, M & Svarer, M 2018, ' Estimating equilibrium effects of job search assistance ', Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 1073-1125 . https://doi.org/10.1086/697513
Randomized experiments provide policy relevant treatment effects if there are no spillovers between participants and nonparticipants. We show that this assumption is violated for a Danish activation program for unemployed workers. Using a difference-
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2e2b623c42918bd74f6742d3c7cb7a97
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/2fe86c7a-43d1-46a2-b742-72ca93c1812d
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/2fe86c7a-43d1-46a2-b742-72ca93c1812d