Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 64
pro vyhledávání: '"Piero Gottardi"'
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Studies.
This paper studies a competitive model of insurance markets in which consumers are privately informed about their risk and risk preferences. We provide a characterization of the equilibria, which depend non-trivially on consumers’ type distribution
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dc8c7f1106f1566dedc18f4800d4d4b2
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad017
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad017
Autor:
Piero Gottardi, Alberto Bisin
In the context of an epidemic, a society is forced to face a system of externalities in consumption and in production. Command economy interventions can support efficient allocations at the cost of severe information requirements. Competitive markets
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::daf6a1189fbb48d791260f02bcbb4b0c
http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3752307
http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3752307
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ab47da8cca88274267cbbe65939ac162
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3772091
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3772091
Autor:
Douglas Gale, Piero Gottardi
We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity services of bank deposits make deposits a “cheaper” source of funding than equity. In equilibrium, banks pass on part of this funding advantage in
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::669b4be383d5f586dea43b2b9063291c
http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3722529
http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3722529
This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap-talk information. We find that the level of trade in these markets is very small and eventually vanishes. Sellers provide low-quality information even when doing so does not
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::52bc48c2e8ae1ffb746fae4c81027d1d
http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3725348
http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3725348
Autor:
Piero Gottardi, Sarah Auster
We study the competitive equilibria in a market with adverse selection and search frictions. Uninformed buyers post general direct mechanisms and informed sellers choose where to direct their search. We demonstrate that there exists a unique equilibr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fc480f6b974af0540188125fc3a0f454
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217082
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217082
We show that repurchase agreements (repos) arise as the instrument of choice to borrow in a competitive model with limited commitment. The repo contract traded in equilibrium provides insurance against fluctuations in the asset price in states where
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b7ff47c1f3889f177f57e2a9d94ca2c8
http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3722528
http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3722528
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 18:1-28
When individuals’ labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how? In a two period general equilibrium model with production, we derive a decomposition formula of the welfare
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1028a41ff98747785884bf5dc5869144
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12135
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12135
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2017, John Nash Memorial, 103, pp.145-167. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013⟩
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, 2017, John Nash Memorial, 103, pp.145-167. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013⟩
This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. The main focus of the paper lies in the analysis of the costs of delegation, primarily agency c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::14c0b41f709c1db0b69d93f335875a85
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01238046/document
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01238046/document
Autor:
Douglas M. Gale, Piero Gottardi
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2fe71e0ef4b1ee5c97844baf3d35ac86
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3023229
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3023229