Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 69
pro vyhledávání: '"Pettigrew, A. G."'
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 1988 Jul . 234(1275), 199-218.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/36302
Autor:
Pettigrew, A. G., Carlile, S.
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 1984 Aug . 222(1227), 231-242.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/36015
Autor:
Carlile, S., Pettigrew, A. G.
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 1984 Aug . 222(1227), 243-257.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/36016
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 1981 Aug . 212(1189), 459-485.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/35663
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 1981 Aug . 212(1189), 433-457.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/35662
Autor:
Pettigrew, I. G.1 pett-ph0@wpmail.paisley.ac.uk, Lines, D. I. A.2 dave.lines@diagnosticsonar.com, Kirk, K. J.1, Cochran, S.1
Publikováno v:
Insight: Non-Destructive Testing & Condition Monitoring. Apr2006, Vol. 48 Issue 4, p228-232. 5p.
Autor:
Pettigrew, I. G.1 pett-ph0@wpmail.paisley.ac.uk, Lines, D. I. A.2 dave.lines@diagnosticsonar.com, Kirk, K. J.1, Cochran, S1
Publikováno v:
Insight: Non-Destructive Testing & Condition Monitoring. Feb2006, Vol. 48 Issue 2, p80-83. 4p. 7 Color Photographs, 2 Black and White Photographs, 2 Graphs.
Autor:
Pettigrew, Richard G
Publikováno v:
Pettigrew, R G 2015, ' Book Symposium : Transformative Experience and Decision Theory ', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 766-774 . https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12240
[no abstract]
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______2642::5f2ca6c7438b42e45566e1600ac1240f
https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/b4796dab-2003-4e0b-99ef-9c3bc276b547
https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/b4796dab-2003-4e0b-99ef-9c3bc276b547
Autor:
Pettigrew, Richard G
Publikováno v:
Pettigrew, R G 2015, ' Accuracy and the Credence-Belief Connection ' vol 15, no. 16, pp. 1-20 .
Probabilism says an agent is rational only if her credences are probabilistic. This paper is concerned with the so-called Accuracy Dominance Argument for Probabilism. This argument begins with the claim that the sole fundamental source of epistemic v
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______2642::e6741742c32895eee8b5a2e91d82a787
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0015.0161983/196b5fce-f873-4fe2-b9fd-737b94a537be
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0015.0161983/196b5fce-f873-4fe2-b9fd-737b94a537be
Publikováno v:
Pettigrew, R G & Titelbaum, M G 2014, ' Deference Done Right ', Philosophers' Imprint, vol. 14, no. 35, pp. 1-19 . < http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0014.035 >
There are many kinds of epistemic experts to which we might wish to defer in setting our credences. These include: highly rational agents, objective chances, our own future credences, our own current credences, and evidential (or logical) probabiliti
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______2642::59234308a091941d08d94319ad3a9152
https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/1cefbd1a-1025-4bc6-800a-eb407dcc50f9
https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/1cefbd1a-1025-4bc6-800a-eb407dcc50f9