Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 274
pro vyhledávání: '"Peter-J. Jost"'
Autor:
Sliwka, Dirk
Publikováno v:
Management Revue, 2002 Jan 01. 13(3), 234-237.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41783331
Autor:
Regnet, Erika
Publikováno v:
Management Revue, 2001 Jan 01. 12(1), 79-80.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41783192
Autor:
Peter-J. Jost
Publikováno v:
Journal of Sports Economics. 22:823-863
The Union of European Football Associations is currently reviewing the away goals rule during extra time in the knockout rounds of the Champions League. We model extra time as a two-stage contest. Assuming a home-field advantage we analyze the effect
Autor:
Peter-J. Jost
Publikováno v:
Journal of Sports Economics. 22:27-74
We model a soccer match between two heterogeneous teams as a two-stage contest where each team chooses its attacking and defending effort for each half of the match. We characterize the optimal teams’ efforts as well as the optimal effort allocatio
Autor:
Anna Theresa Ressi, Peter-J. Jost
This paper considers price competition in a market where two firms sell a homogeneous service to a continuum of customers differing with respect to some exogenous characteristic. Our paper's novelty consists of explicitly acknowledging a distinctive
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::79eddfa7e4ecbbabff23b4ad2be3b6a4
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265036
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/265036
Publikováno v:
Schmalenbach Business Review. 72:343-345
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 168, 419-433. Elsevier
Czerny, A I, Fosgerau, M, Jost, P J & van Ommeren, J N 2019, ' Why pay for jobs (and not for tasks)? ', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 168, pp. 419-433 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.020
Czerny, A I, Fosgerau, M, Jost, P J & van Ommeren, J N 2019, ' Why pay for jobs (and not for tasks)? ', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 168, pp. 419-433 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.020
Consider a principal who assigns a job with two tasks to two identical agents. Monitoring the agents’ efforts is costly. Therefore the principal rewards the agents based on their (noisy) relative outputs. This study addresses the question of whethe
Autor:
Peter-J. Jost, Cedric Duvinage
Publikováno v:
Journal of Sports Economics. 20:1014-1050
This article models the role of a referee in a contest, in which players can invest into both productive and sabotage effort. The model shows that (1) a referee significantly influences the equilibrium strategies of the contestants, (2) whether or no
Autor:
Peter-J. Jost
Publikováno v:
Small Business Economics. 56:39-64
The purpose of this paper is to study the incentives of entrepreneurial actors to collaborate with others in order to achieve superior performance. We consider an environment composed of n entrepeneurial actors who are identical with regard to the ty