Zobrazeno 1 - 8
of 8
pro vyhledávání: '"Peter H. Kriss"'
Publikováno v:
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol 6, Pp 602-615 (2011)
Slowing climate change will almost certainly require a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, but agreement on who should reduce emissions by how much is difficult, in part because of the self-serving bias—the tendency to believe that what is benef
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/e7928e9a89d14c82b065f7573501a88c
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 130:225-241
Prior experimental evidence finds decentralized pre-play communication to facilitate efficient coordination among interdependent agents. However, the kind of communication in these experiments is unrealistic for many economic and organizational conte
We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre-play messages. In a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8e96bb782ebd0614e3dc080ac29718bc
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/144993
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/144993
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Prior research demonstrates a willingness to incur costs to punish norm violators. But, how strong are the motives underlying such acts? Will people rely on "excuses" to avoid acting on costly punishment intentions, as with other costly pro-social ac
Autor:
Peter H. Kriss, Roberto A. Weber
Publikováno v:
Handbook of Economic Organization ISBN: 9781782548225
This chapter reviews research in which economic laboratory experiments are used to shed light on the processes that influence organizational formation and change. An organization, in these experiments, is represented by an abstract collective product
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::641a825159c34e52058a9e38d699cd8a
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849803984.00023
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849803984.00023
We explore bargaining, using ultimatum games, when one party, the proposer, possesses private information about the pie size and can either misrepresent this information through untruthful statements (explicit deception) or through information-reveal
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7b03005c1f435bfbf9abc01938d0e8a2
https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-70883
https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-70883
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study communication in a two-player coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Prior research demonstrates that efficient coordination is difficult without communication but obtains regularly with (mandatory) costless pre-play messages. In a
Autor:
Peter H. Kriss, Roberto Weber
This comprehensive and groundbreaking Handbook integrates economic and organization theories to help elucidate the design and evolution of economic organization. Economic organization is regarded both as a subject of inquiry and as an emerging discip
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::09c56353fe14e1fd12e0ed24600a86ea
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781849803984.00023.xml
https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781849803984.00023.xml