Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 15
pro vyhledávání: '"Peter Buisseret"'
Autor:
Vincent Anesi, Peter Buisseret
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 14:616-644
We study the limits of dynamic electoral accountability when voters are uncertain about politicians’ characteristics (adverse selection) and their actions (moral hazard). Existing work argues that voters cannot achieve their first-best payoff. This
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f1bbedcedc3aa4b7f741bd3137e6c40d
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200311
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200311
Autor:
Peter Buisseret, Richard Van Weelden
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review: Insights. 4:341-352
We study an election between two office-seeking candidates who are polarized along a partisan issue dimension when one candidate has a valence advantage. The candidates compete by choosing policy on a second issue dimension about which voters’ pref
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::17755df13abd1f33d41f0b5a4eecd2c8
https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210169
https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210169
Publikováno v:
American Journal of Political Science. 66:714-729
In list proportional representation (PR) systems, parties shape political selection. We propose a theory of party list choice and elections in list PR systems. Our results describe how a party allocates candidates of heterogenoeus quality across list
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ffa00b0a977f98018542906bec6bc881
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12691
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12691
Autor:
Peter Buisseret, Carlo Prato
We compare multi-candidate elections under plurality rule versus ranked choice voting (RCV). In our framework candidates choose whether to pursue a narrow campaign that targets their base, or instead pursue a broad campaign that can appeal to the ent
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::89e8f13cc640d0d3503a632fca584269
https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/ukras
https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/ukras
Autor:
Carlo Prato, Peter Buisseret
Publikováno v:
American Journal of Political Science. 66:156-170
We develop a new framework to study legislative representation in list proportional representation (PR) systems. Our model studies a legislator’s incentives to balance the competing interests of party leaders and local voters under a variety of lis
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::467659111881d24a2e45bf42c69d7b74
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12559
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12559
Autor:
Peter Buisseret, Richard Van Weelden
Publikováno v:
American Journal of Political Science. 64:356-370
We study an elections model in which political parties are internally divided betweenan âeliteâ and a âbaseâ whose preferences are imperfectly aligned. Elites are better informedabout the quality of potential nominees, and their e
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1c0aefe55bbf71149fad2ad5d4aad370
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12457
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12457
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review. 110:922-942
We study multi-district legislative elections between two office-seeking parties when the election pits a relatively strong party against a weaker party ; when each party faces uncertainty about how voter preferences will evolve during the campaign;
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::716225f28c936e5c4b5f3ab352748901
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181606
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181606
Autor:
Peter Buisseret, Carlo Prato
Publikováno v:
Journal of Theoretical Politics. 32:96-111
Understanding voter preferences in proportional representation (PR) systems is an essential first step towards understanding candidate selection and behavior. We unearth conceptual challenges of constructing a theory of sincere voting in PR elections
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::32c5d9bc5d2f610b6100dbbfc29758cf
https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819892342
https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819892342
Autor:
Dan Bernhardt, Peter Buisseret
Publikováno v:
American Political Science Review. 112:1016-1035
We study dynamic international agreements when one of the negotiating parties faces a threat of electoral replacement during negotiations, when agreements made before the election are the starting point for any subsequent renegotiation, and when gove
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2b101910c5b4dbc0e1fecc356efcfa54
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000400
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000400
Autor:
Peter Buisseret
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 104:494-506
I study electoral competition between established parties under threat of entry by a challenger under non-majoritarian run-off elections. In contrast with classical majoritarian run-off elections, I show how non-majoritarian rules can facilitate two-
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::493b8fbdd22923cb2b639ab391541e05
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.007
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.007