Corruption and optimal regulation under common agency

Autor: Pedro Hemsley

Publikováno v: EconomiA, Vol 17, Iss 2, Pp 199-209 (2016)

I show that it is optimal to separate non-benevolent regulators when regulated projects are large. Separation prevents regulators from coordinating to appropriate all of the agent's informational rent when they know the type of the latter; therefore,

Externí odkaz: https://doaj.org/article/5dd5b82da9c6489fa26561998c2f49c1

Market structure and knowledge acquisition by firms

Autor: Rafael Morais, Karinna Di Iulio, Pedro Hemsley

Publikováno v: Journal of Economic Studies. 48:1128-1144

PurposeRecent models in firm theory assume that problems have to be solved for production to take place and that knowledge is the main input for problem-solving. This paper characterizes the relationship between the predictability of production prces

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8e208234e94f7e541633fffe29c2b67a
https://doi.org/10.1108/jes-02-2020-0071

Collective memory and means of claims in democracies: Evidence from Chile (2019-2021)

Autor: Pedro Hemsley, Armando N.G.L Martins

This article argues that protests are a primary driver of political engagement in nations with a memory of institutional violence. The hypothesis is tested in the case of Chilean protests from October 2019 to March 2020 triggered by police violence E

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a4d3edf94167a2193d69523fef0a740c
https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2021-vwcxr

Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment

Autor: Eduardo Zilberman, Vinicius Carrasco, Pedro Hemsley

Publikováno v: Economic Theory. 68:53-81

In a repeated unobserved endowment economy in which agents negotiate long-term contracts with a financial intermediary, we study the risk sharing implications of the interaction between incentive compatibility constraints (due to private information)

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::68980ec51ddf22191a2593f91d0c0511
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1112-1

AN ANALYSIS OF THE BRAZILIAN LEGISLATION FOR QUALITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Autor: Pedro Hemsley

Publikováno v: Economic Analysis of Law Review; Vol. 7 No. 1 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 153-164
Economic Analysis of Law Review ; Vol. 7 Núm. 1 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 153-164
Economic Analysis of Law Review; v. 7 n. 1 (2016): Economic Analysis of Law Review; 153-164
Economic Analysis of law Review
Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB)
instacron:UCB

Low-quality education is a major concern for public policy. In Brazil, the government addresses this issue with a Quality-Assurance Policy: colleges must be accredited before starting operation, and then are audited by the government periodically. Lo

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6d89761e2cba62c6d0c4dd61db89a7fa
https://portalrevistas.ucb.br/index.php/EALR/article/view/6612