Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 31
pro vyhledávání: '"Pedro Calleja"'
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d07146907c85d018d4cf1b34ee134b3a
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4382675
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4382675
Autor:
Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ca25c83ad211fe1a5b308685e24329b3
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4350708
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4350708
Autor:
Joseba RIOS-GARAIZAR, Diego GARATE MAIDAGAN, Asier GOMEZ OLIVENCIA, Diego ARCEREDILLO ALONSO, Eneko IRIARTE AVILÉS, Alejandro GARCÍA MORENO, Daniel GARRIDO PIMENTEL, Ziortza SAN PEDRO CALLEJA
Publikováno v:
Zephyrus, Vol 72, Iss 0, Pp 15-38 (2014)
Arlanpe Cave site, situated in a strategic halfway between the Cantabrian coast and the Alavese Plateau, yielded a Solutrean level (level II) dated at the end of this period, between 21047 and 19909 cal BP. The lithic industry displays some unique ch
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/e4c87f56425a45c999d1e2da3b27821f
Publikováno v:
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Calleja, P, Llerena, F & Sudhölter, P 2021, ' Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems ', Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 109, no. January, pp. 45-51 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.006
Universidad de Barcelona
Calleja, P, Llerena, F & Sudhölter, P 2021, ' Constrained welfare egalitarianism in surplus-sharing problems ', Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 109, no. January, pp. 45-51 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.006
We introduce the constrained egalitarian surplus-sharing rule fCE, which distributes an amount of a divisible resource so that the poorer agents’ resulting payoffs become equal but not larger than any remaining agent’s status quo payoff. We show
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f76782befe4c98321bb0527382903e9e
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.006
Autor:
Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 221:110921
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2599948c32703588fb87d9b2c934fc9a
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110921
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110921
Autor:
Francesc Llerena, Pedro Calleja
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 48:287-310
On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we introduce path monotonicity, a property closely related to fairness (van den Brink, in Int J Game Theory 30:309–319, 2001). The principle of fairness states that if a game changes by
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0da4a502f2c8198fb185364d07d13878
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00661-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00661-9
Publikováno v:
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Universidad de Barcelona
This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems to minimize the sum of completion times. We assume that there is an initial schedule to process the jobs (consisting of a number of operations) on the machines and that eac
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2e9be1cc432d227b4748120147b13f3a
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/186291
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/186291
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::077576479ad02c2b3701083a2cf08b61
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4024220
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4024220
Autor:
Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena
Publikováno v:
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Universidad de Barcelona
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) has been axiomatically characterized from different points of view. van den Brink (2001) proposes a characterization by means of efficiency, fairness and the null player property. In this paper, we characterize the f
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a35e641b48983e66fca13a0d06c9d8eb
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/159858
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/159858
Publikováno v:
Calleja, P, Llerena, F & Sudhölter, P 2021, ' Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games ', Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 95, 102477 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102477
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c3eb964da5e186eaf68d31411b5c713e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3577521
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3577521