Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 33
pro vyhledávání: '"Pech, Gerald"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Integration, 2017 Mar 01. 32(1), 65-89.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44133858
Coalition Governments versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes
Autor:
Pech, Gerald
Publikováno v:
Public Choice, 2004 Jul 01. 121(1/2), 1-24.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/30026509
Autor:
Pech, Gerald
Publikováno v:
FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis, 1997 Jan 01. 54(4), 537-562.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40912796
The paper investigates prices and deadweight loss in multiproduct monopoly with linear interrelated demand and constant marginal costs. We show that, with commonly used models for linear demand such as the Bowley demand and vertically or horizontally
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______901::5a2a966f36390499a7db02a4df27c84f
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13051
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13051
This paper characterizes, under the most general conditions to date, the steady-state equilibria of a symmetric, two-country trade model in which countries move in alternating-move, dynamic either tariffsetting or quota-setting games in Markov Perfec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::b84ebefa57022a0a0ce3295a0b032edf
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56549
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56549
Autor:
Neumärker, Bernhard, Pech, Gerald
We characterize equilibria of an income reporting game with bounded returns and no commitment where detected tax evaders are charged the maximally feasible amount. Introducing partial commitment to punishment relief eliminates multiplicity of equilib
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::f022b64ee8caf2f896d4839b8a4757f9
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/57635/1/699902355.pdf
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/57635/1/699902355.pdf
Autor:
Pech, Gerald
Publikováno v:
FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis, 1999 Jan 01. 56(2), 273-276.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40912884
Why does the government not defect from the constitution? This article focuses on the dynamic restraints the government faces under the rule of law: violations against unconstitutional laws are not punished under the constitution. If a violating gove
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::0cb73ca796949670df7d3303d49d8ec7
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23130/1/2003-01_fiscalconst.pdf
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23130/1/2003-01_fiscalconst.pdf