Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 124
pro vyhledávání: '"Paulo A. S. Veloso"'
Publikováno v:
O Que Nos Faz Pensar, Vol 25, Iss 39, Pp 157-191 (2016)
We present a graphical approach to classical and intuitionistic modal logics, which provides uniform formalisms for expressing, analysing and comparing their semantics. This approach uses the flexibility of graphical calculi to express directly and i
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/8c3d78e63334413da789f97f90eef99d
Publikováno v:
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, Vol 113, Iss Proc. LSFA 2012, Pp 153-168 (2013)
We introduce a refutation graph calculus for classical first-order predicate logic, which is an extension of previous ones for binary relations. One reduces logical consequence to establishing that a constructed graph has empty extension, i. e. it re
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/094f23313f144d3ea816c91ea04ba263
Publikováno v:
Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, Vol 81, Iss Proc. LSFA 2011, Pp 47-62 (2012)
We introduce a graphical refutation calculus for relational inclusions: it reduces establishing a relational inclusion to establishing that a graph constructed from it has empty extension. This sound and complete calculus is conceptually simpler and
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/04826192290f4071a30fce7636f0c57e
Publikováno v:
DoisPontos, Vol 6, Iss 2, Pp 145-163 (2009)
Logic does not have purely existential theorems: the only existential sentences that are valid are those with valid universal analogues. Here, we show indeed this is so, when properly interpreted: every existential validity has a simple universal ana
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/1029c318c1c747c2bad91d043ee4fbad
Publikováno v:
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 No. 2 (2019); 153-173
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (2019); 153-173
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 23 n. 2 (2019); 153-173
Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, Vol 23, Iss 2, Pp 153-173 (2019)
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (2019); 153-173
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 23 n. 2 (2019); 153-173
Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, Vol 23, Iss 2, Pp 153-173 (2019)
A theory of magnitudes involves criteria for their comparison, equivalence and addition. We examine these aspects from an abstract viewpoint, stressing independence and definability. These considerations are triggered by the so-called De Zolt’s pri
Publikováno v:
The Review of Symbolic Logic. 15:197-224
A theory of magnitudes involves criteria for their equivalence, comparison and addition. In this article we examine these aspects from an abstract viewpoint, by focusing on the so-called De Zolt’s postulate in the theory of equivalence of plane pol
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Computer Science. 685:83-103
We present a sound and complete graph calculus for modalities. This calculus is a general framework for expressing modal formulas and frame properties, with a rich repertoire of relations, and reasoning about them in a uniform manner. The calculus em
Publikováno v:
LSFA
We present a graph approach to intuitionistic modal logics, which provides uniform formalisms for expressing, analysing and comparing Kripke-like semantics. This approach uses the flexibility of graph calculi to express directly and intuitively possi
Publikováno v:
Diagrammatic Representation and Inference ISBN: 9783319913759
Diagrams
Diagrams
We introduce a general approach, based on diagrams, to the specification and construction of model checkers. This approach gives general model checkers that can be instantiated to a model checker for a specific modal logic with semantics described by
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2afca4be55975b601b517a17a7725f62
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91376-6_60
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91376-6_60
Publikováno v:
Disputatio. 4:889-910
It is part of an old folklore that logic should not have existential theorems or existential validities. One should not prove in pure logic the existence of anything whatsoever; nothing could be proved by means of logic alone to necessarily exist. Wh