Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 28
pro vyhledávání: '"Paul Henne"'
Autor:
carlotta pavese, Paul Henne
In certain cases, people judge that agents bring about ends intentionally but also that they do not bring about the means that brought about those ends intentionally—even though bringing about the ends and means is just as likely. We call this diff
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d99241c310a63dcf187a1d37e06a876f
https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/fp74d
https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/fp74d
Epistemologists have long believed that epistemic luck undermines propositional knowledge. Action theorists have long believed that agentive luck undermines intentional action. But is there a relationship between agentive luck and epistemic luck? Whi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e2600e1149f35e259c8fe9ef77115cb7
https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/r6tkj
https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/r6tkj
Autor:
Samuel Murray, Paul Henne
Publikováno v:
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action ISBN: 9781350266322
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7a7a7b82f1f79e2ff47773e015ce7fcc
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350266353.0006
https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350266353.0006
People more frequently select norm-violating factors, relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of some outcome. Until recently, this abnormal-selection effect has been studied using retrospective vignette-based paradigms. We use a novel set of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5c77bc67d4a44be207468640fb6109a1
Autor:
Paul Henne
In this chapter, I review some issues in the metaphysics of causation that have been widely-discussed by experimental philosophers. After I review the work investigating the effects of normality on causal judgment, I discuss the work on action-omissi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ef97d7a30972b1ec8c9033737e348f71
https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/w4g3y
https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/w4g3y
Autor:
Kevin O'Neill, Paul Henne
Publikováno v:
Cognitive scienceReferences. 46(5)
Mike accidentally knocked against a bottle. Seeing that the bottle was about to fall, Jack was just about to catch it when Peter accidentally knocked against him, making Jack unable to catch it. Jack did not grab the bottle, and it fell to the ground
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::22d540bf243eed24abec69f3c969e02a
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35488801
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/35488801
Publikováno v:
2022 Conference on Cognitive Computational Neuroscience.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9a07308a5040bf5e5e9bb0e7aaa10b64
https://doi.org/10.32470/ccn.2022.1021-0
https://doi.org/10.32470/ccn.2022.1021-0
The human capacity for causal judgment has long been thought to depend on an ability to consider counterfactual alternatives: the lightning strike caused the forest fire because had it not struck, the forest fire would not have ensued. To accommodate
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d7c03bc995d54fbc8b6d23a6cc512ef5
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/cgvwf
https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/cgvwf
Publikováno v:
Cognition. 190:157-164
People’s causal judgments are susceptible to the action effect, whereby they judge actions to be more causal than inactions. We offer a new explanation for this effect, the counterfactual explanation: people judge actions to be more causal than ina
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4697ddec0859a6bc7b59e789ac6e3b82
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.006