Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 97
pro vyhledávání: '"Patrick W. Schmitz"'
Autor:
Patrick W. Schmitz, Daniel Müller
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 184:653-669
A principal hires an agent to provide a verifiable service. Initially, the agent can exert unobservable effort to reduce his disutility from providing the service. If the agent is free to waive his right to quit, he may voluntarily sign a contract sp
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::fc6c5ebf41868cef2aa43fd945507e89
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.004
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.004
Autor:
Patrick W. Schmitz
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 226:111103
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a1998603d364bd3c868b32d77a9f6b72
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111103
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111103
Autor:
Patrick W. Schmitz
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 182:100-112
The analysis of adverse selection problems in seller-buyer relationships has typically been based on the assumption that private information is uncertifiable, while in practice it may well be certifiable. If a buyer has certifiable private informatio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::570bfa5c902aab8fc82ed2f55b58202c
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.038
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.038
Autor:
Patrick W. Schmitz, Eva I. Hoppe
Publikováno v:
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 123:238-266
The government wants an infrastructure-based public service to be provided. First, the infrastructure has to be built; subsequently, it has to be operated. Should the government bundle the building and operating tasks in a public–private partnershi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9f8e31a87c6695cac3d14cfcf8be1466
https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12393
https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12393
Autor:
Patrick W Schmitz
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
A buyer wants to purchase an innovative good from a seller. Both parties are risk-neutral, and payments from the buyer to the seller must be non-negative. After the contract is signed, the seller privately observes a signal which may be informative a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::acd178aa0ac7df801a1b87768ef4c0ea
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4097698
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4097698
Autor:
Patrick W. Schmitz
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 224:111012
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::98bea93509e36dac9f6755e25e565d99
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111012
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111012
Autor:
Patrick W. Schmitz
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The analysis of adverse selection problems in seller-buyer relationships has typically been based on the assumption that private information is uncertifiable, while in practice it may well be certifiable. If a buyer has certifiable private informatio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::26d1b34557f43f7ca0519971cb92798c
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3759238
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3759238
Autor:
Patrick W. Schmitz, Eva I. Hoppe
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 109:544-564
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments with verifiable effort. In our experiment, the players endogenously negotiat
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5335a4d74a4b34fc9a36ea64aa2d419d
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006
Autor:
Patrick W. Schmitz
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 144:153-165
Consider a partnership consisting of two symmetrically informed parties who may each own a share of an asset. It is ex post efficient that tomorrow the party with the larger valuation gets the asset. Yet, today the parties can make investments to enh
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5fab26e9459d55b4482968c32ded6447
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.021
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.021
Autor:
Patrick W. Schmitz
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 159:96-99
In the Grossman–Hart–Mooreproperty rights approach to the theory of the firm, it is usually assumed that information is symmetric. Ownership matters for investment incentives, provided that investments are partly relationship-specific. We study t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f93f053ceff4df14ab67e26dd1c7a84a
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.026
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.026