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pro vyhledávání: '"Patrick A. Leoni"'
Autor:
Patrick L. Leoni
Publikováno v:
Journal of Applied Mathematics, Vol 2014 (2014)
This paper investigates simultaneous learning about both nature and others’ actions in repeated games and identifies a set of sufficient conditions for which Harsanyi’s doctrine holds. Players have a utility function over infinite histories that
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/0dc3990469554317ab9646a28c17e380
Autor:
Patrick L. Leoni
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economic Theory. 14:201-205
We study optimal contracts when R&D is outsourced to another company. We find that, when a realistic assumption holds, the optimal contract always leads in equilibrium to low chances of having a successful technical innovation, given announced compen
Autor:
Patrick L. Leoni
Publikováno v:
Adaptive Behavior. 25:24-29
In normal form games, we model the largely observed psychological phenomenon of systematic and extreme punishment after a deviation, regardless of the cost. After establishing basic properties, we show that this notion characterizes a weak form of Pa
Autor:
Patrick L. Leoni, Frederik Lundtofte
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 153:80-82
We explore the link between informativeness of signals, stochastic dominance and equilibrium bids in a multi-unit auction with risk averse bidders. We show that for a particular class of signal distributions, there is a one-to-one relation between in
Autor:
Patrick L. Leoni
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Patrick L. Leoni
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Under natural assumptions, we show that the set of Stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria in pure strategies is non-empty for stochastic repeated games with complementarities. We characterize the set of extremal SMPE as unique fixed points of well-chos
Autor:
Patrick L. Leoni
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Patrick L. Leoni
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
I consider many principals who interact sequentially against the same agent. The agent hides his disutility for efforts from the principals, and tries to use this asymmetric information to extract some surplus from the principals. Principals are isol
Autor:
Patrick L. Leoni
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics. 107:129-140
We argue that the use of rational expectations in monopolistic markets, as typically done, is overly restrictive because the rationale of this approach is not met in those markets. In a model that encompasses a general equilibrium framework, we consi
Autor:
Patrick L. Leoni, Fredj Jawadi
Publikováno v:
Macroeconomic Dynamics. 16:376-393
This paper is dedicated to the memory of the great statistician Melvin J. Hinich, with whom we were in contact about this research prior to his untimely death from a tragic fall. We develop a neoclassical growth model with habit formation to exhibit