Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 356
pro vyhledávání: '"Parkes, David C."'
Contracts are the economic framework which allows a principal to delegate a task to an agent -- despite misaligned interests, and even without directly observing the agent's actions. In many modern reinforcement learning settings, self-interested age
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.18074
Autor:
Ravindranath, Sai Srivatsa, Feng, Zhe, Wang, Di, Zaheer, Manzil, Mehta, Aranyak, Parkes, David C.
Revenue-optimal auction design is a challenging problem with significant theoretical and practical implications. Sequential auction mechanisms, known for their simplicity and strong strategyproofness guarantees, are often limited by theoretical resul
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.08022
Differentiable economics uses deep learning for automated mechanism design. Despite strong progress, it has remained an open problem to learn multi-bidder, general, and fully strategy-proof (SP) auctions. We introduce GEneral Menu-based NETwork (GemN
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.07428
We model the role of an online platform disrupting a market with unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers. Each seller can transact with a subset of the buyers whom she already knows, as well as with any additional buyers to whom she is introduced
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.07385
Autor:
Zhang, Edwin, Zhao, Sadie, Wang, Tonghan, Hossain, Safwan, Gasztowtt, Henry, Zheng, Stephan, Parkes, David C., Tambe, Milind, Chen, Yiling
Artificial Intelligence (AI) holds promise as a technology that can be used to improve government and economic policy-making. This paper proposes a new research agenda towards this end by introducing Social Environment Design, a general framework for
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.14090
We propose ABCs (Adaptive Branching through Child stationarity), a best-of-both-worlds algorithm combining Boltzmann Q-learning (BQL), a classic reinforcement learning algorithm for single-agent domains, and counterfactual regret minimization (CFR),
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11835
The role of a market maker is to simultaneously offer to buy and sell quantities of goods, often a financial asset such as a share, at specified prices. An automated market maker (AMM) is a mechanism that offers to trade according to some predetermin
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.09129
Autor:
Watson-Daniels, Jamelle, Calmon, Flavio du Pin, D'Amour, Alexander, Long, Carol, Parkes, David C., Ustun, Berk
Machine learning models in modern mass-market applications are often updated over time. One of the foremost challenges faced is that, despite increasing overall performance, these updates may flip specific model predictions in unpredictable ways. In
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.07745
We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This problem generalizes the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework and is ubiqui
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.04971
The $\textit{data market design}$ problem is a problem in economic theory to find a set of signaling schemes (statistical experiments) to maximize expected revenue to the information seller, where each experiment reveals some of the information known
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.20096