Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 137
pro vyhledávání: '"Pablo T. Spiller"'
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 39:281-308
We present a public procurement model in which contractual flexibility and political tolerance for contractual deviations determine renegotiations. In the model, contractual flexibility allows for adaptation without formal renegotiation, while politi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e323c9eeb78189d4bdad22764842945c
https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewab039
https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewab039
We present a model of public procurement in which both contractual flexibility and political tolerance for contractual deviations determine renegotiations. In the model, contractual flexibility allows for adaptation without formal renegotiation while
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f9756f32129b829be0f94878616b981f
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28491
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28491
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::25bc8d4a6de47d40206618467a709191
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3790229
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3790229
Autor:
Pablo T. Spiller, Marian W. Moszoro
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 21:945-966
Do public agents undertake socially inefficient activities to protect themselves? In politically contestable markets, part of the lack of flexibility in the design and implementation of the public procurement process reflects public agents' risk adap
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8178fa335406582aceffb82ec1f54785
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12325
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12325
Autor:
Pablo T. Spiller, Marian W. Moszoro
Publikováno v:
Economia e Politica Industriale. 45:5-16
We analyze the implications of plausible third-party challenges to the legitimacy of a transaction for contract design. To the extent that such challenges impose reputation and transaction costs, the scrutinized agent has an incentive to choose contr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5ec8edd84920f4b60e8a9ba52c26b383
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40812-017-0087-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40812-017-0087-4
Publikováno v:
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. 13:396-427
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5c5182870f8f5d363e386dc1011c4c9a
https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12119
https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.12119
Autor:
Pablo T. Spiller, Marian W. Moszoro
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study the link between the choice of rule-based financing instruments and political hazards using the municipal bond market. We provide evidence that in politically contested cities, mayors are more likely to issue revenue bonds and choose competi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3819459d4533b39f6b4ec5b17a2f103a
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2493554
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2493554
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 161:157-181
We examine the effect of consumer advocate participation in administrative procedures on regulatory policy. We use a unique panel database of rate reviews conducted for US electric utilities from 1980 to 2007 to assess how state consumer advocates af
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::927baf79cc71784bb1f8e69daf3b9822
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0145-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0145-z
Autor:
Pablo T. Spiller
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 89:232-242
This paper discusses the fundamental underpinnings and some implications of transaction cost regulation (TCR), a framework to analyze the interaction between governments and investors fundamentally, but not exclusively, in utility industries. TCR see
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2d10aaf71e08b2191b11c8d66cb68534
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.03.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.03.002
Autor:
Marian W. Moszoro, Pablo T. Spiller
Publikováno v:
The Elgar Companion to Ronald H. Coase ISBN: 9781782547990
Early economic research on natural monopoly regulation focused on market failure—pricing tariffs and externalities. While Coase’s multi-tariff marginal cost pricing became the standard, his approach to externality regulation as a contractual issu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6fa4c6a8dda15c1bde33feaa1e9820e4
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782547990.00030
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782547990.00030