Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 81
pro vyhledávání: '"Pablo Ruiz Verdú"'
Autor:
Ravi Singh, Pablo Ruiz-Verdú
We analyze how boards' reputational concerns influence executive compensation and the use of hidden pay. Independent boards reduce disclosed pay to signal their independence, but are more likely than manager-friendly boards to use hidden pay or to di
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2145d302f4b2a19f36f4a93d7140d811
https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34639
https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34639
Autor:
Pablo Ruiz Verdú, Patricia Boyallian, Carlos Bellón Núñez-Mera, Margarita Samartín Sáenz, Sergio Vicente, Jaime H. García-Palacios, Augusto Hasman, Gerald Dwyer
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b2c1149c0cf174abc9f96809669cbc50
https://doi.org/10.22429/euc2019.001
https://doi.org/10.22429/euc2019.001
Publikováno v:
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
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In this article, we shed light on the debate about the financial performance of socially responsible investment (SRI) mutual funds by separately analyzing the contributions of before-fee performance and fees to SRI funds’ performance, and by invest
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e0e85d066d1d6ec9dfe2978babf34f90
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-009-0260-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-009-0260-4
Autor:
Inderst, Roman a, c, Opp, Marcus M. b, c, d, e, ⁎
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Financial Economics January 2025 163
Autor:
Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, Patricia Boyallian
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We propose a simple measure of the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs of highly levered financial institutions, levered delta, which captures the incentives to take on risk generated by CEOs' stock holdings. Using this measure, we find that stronger
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::17f7c978758f0dad5320b488da710f58
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2571332
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2571332
We propose a model of delegated expertise designed to analyze executive compensation. An expert has to pick one of two possible decisions. By exerting effort the expert can obtain private information on these decisions. The expert’s decision and it
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::0d1f4ca7670f8f5d2afa58e8a2a4b969
http://documentos.fedea.net/pubs/dt/2010/dt-2010-29.pdf
http://documentos.fedea.net/pubs/dt/2010/dt-2010-29.pdf
Autor:
Javier Gil-Bazo, Pablo Ruiz-Verdú
Publikováno v:
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
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Business connections can mitigate agency conflicts by facilitating efficient information transfers, but can also be channels for inefficient favoritism. I analyze these two effects in the mutual fund industry and find that fund directors and advisory
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5abf04227186a4f51779eee654905e05
http://hdl.handle.net/10016/7474
http://hdl.handle.net/10016/7474
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In this paper, we shed light on the debate about the financial performance of socially responsible investment (SRI) mutual funds by separately analyzing the contributions of before-fee performance and fees to SRI funds' performance and by investigati
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::946018fef058295853fdbf2e673fb020
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1307043
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1307043
Autor:
Javier Gil-Bazo, Pablo Ruiz-Verdú
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
In this paper, we develop a model of the market for equity mutual funds that captures three key characteristics of this market. First, there is competition among funds. Second, fund managers’ ability is not observed by investors before making their
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::41f67cefc8236c3a7a3ca149ae68dc3a
http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/26318
http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/26318
Autor:
Pablo Ruiz-Verdú
Publikováno v:
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
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If nonunion employers set both wages and employment strategically to forestall unionization, the threat of unionization, despite raising wages, increases employment above competitive levels, in contrast with the prediction of standard models. Publica
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9b3994cc94a712bcaf716da37a9b3c88
https://hdl.handle.net/10016/12725
https://hdl.handle.net/10016/12725