Zobrazeno 1 - 9
of 9
pro vyhledávání: '"Pablo Neme"'
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision.
We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions and agents on the other side of the market (hospitals) are endowed with
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 117:20-29
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable matchings. This algorithm relies on the idea of "cycles in preferences"
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 132:255-273
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 106:102845
Autor:
Jorge Oviedo, Pablo Neme
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 110:1-13
For a many-to-one matching market where firms have strict and q -responsive preferences, we give a characterization of the set of strongly stable fractional matchings as the union of the convex hull of all connected sets of stable matchings. We also
Publikováno v:
Journal of Dynamics & Games. 8:61-67
Given two stable matchings in a many-to-one matching market with \begin{document}$ q $\end{document} -responsive preferences, by manipulating the objective function of the linear program that characterizes the stable matching set, we compute the leas
Publikováno v:
Journal of the Operations Research Society of China.
We study stable and strongly stable matchings in the marriage market with indifference in their preferences. We characterize the stable matchings as integer extreme points of a convex polytope. We give an alternative proof for the integrity of the st
Autor:
Jorge Oviedo, Pablo Neme
Publikováno v:
TOP. 28:97-122
In this paper, we characterize the strongly stable fractional matchings for the marriage model as the union of the convex hull of connected sets of stable matchings. Moreover, we present an algorithm that computes the set of matchings necessary to ge
In a many-to-one matching model in which firms' preferences satisfy substitutability, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a firm and an unemployed
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::75433c6b558215d889dda226decbd546