Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 154 495
pro vyhledávání: '"PRINCIPAL-AGENT"'
Autor:
Liu, Junyan, Ratliff, Lillian J.
We study the repeated principal-agent bandit game, where the principal indirectly interacts with the unknown environment by proposing incentives for the agent to play arms. Most existing work assumes the agent has full knowledge of the reward means a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2412.16318
Autor:
Clark, Aubrey
Adding a capacity constraint to a hidden-action principal-agent problem results in the same set of Pareto optimal contracts as the unconstrained problem where output is scaled down by a constant factor. This scaling factor is increasing in the agent'
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2412.01760
Autor:
Djete, Mao Fabrice
In this paper, we address three Principal--Agent problems in a moral hazard context and show that they are connected. We start by studying the problem of Principal with multiple Agents in cooperation. The term cooperation is manifested here by the fa
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.15818
Autor:
Lee, Pei-Chun1 (AUTHOR) pcleephd@gmail.com
Publikováno v:
Journal of Library Administration. Nov/Dec2024, Vol. 64 Issue 8, p920-942. 23p.
Autor:
Djehiche, Boualem, Helgesson, Peter
Publikováno v:
Asian Journal of Economics and Banking, 2024, Vol. 8, Issue 3, pp. 310-334.
Externí odkaz:
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/10.1108/AJEB-05-2024-0065
In day labor markets, workers are particularly vulnerable to wage theft. This paper introduces a principal-agent model to analyze the conditions required to mitigate wage theft through fines and establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions to
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.09305
Autor:
Befekadu, Getachew K
In this technical note, we consider a collaborative learning framework with principal-agent setting, in which the principal at each time-step determines a set of appropriate aggregation coefficients based on how the current parameter estimates from a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.16068
Autor:
Lalević, Nina ninalalevic3@gmail.com
Publikováno v:
Megatrend Review / Megatrend Revija. 2023, Vol. 20 Issue 1, p197-205. 9p.
Autor:
Chiusolo, Alessandro, Hubert, Emma
The recent work by Cvitani\'c, Possama\"i, and Touzi (2018) [9] presents a general approach for continuous-time principal-agent problems, through dynamic programming and second-order backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs). In this paper,
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.09471