Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 329
pro vyhledávání: '"PINYAN LU"'
Autor:
YAONAN JIN1 jinyaonan@huawei.com, PINYAN LU2 lu.pinyan@mail.shufe.edu.cn
Publikováno v:
Journal of the ACM. Oct2023, Vol. 70 Issue 5, p1-19. 86p.
Publikováno v:
SIAM Journal on Computing. 51:1535-1579
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Computer Science. 929:174-190
Autor:
Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) ISBN: 9781611977554
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::76e5a6c207381542b7a1c7c84d1fea57
https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch14
https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch14
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) ISBN: 9781611977554
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d105e5ae414a7ff8c2af71ee1456d882
https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch147
https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch147
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 26:1319-1325
In cooperative games, a key question is to find a division of payoffs to coalition members in a fair manner. Nucleolus is one of such solution concepts that provides a stable solution for the grand coalition. We study the computation of the nucleolus
Autor:
Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu
Publikováno v:
2022 IEEE 63rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS).
Autor:
Shaofeng Zhang, Meng Liu, Junchi Yan, Hengrui Zhang, Lingxiao Huang, Xiaokang Yang, Pinyan Lu
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining.
Autor:
Chenyang Xu, Pinyan Lu
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well-studied mechanism design settings, we make use of imperfect predict
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Designing dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanisms for a seller to generate (approximately) optimal revenue by selling items to players is a fundamental problem in Bayesian mechanism design. However, most existing studies assume that