Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 67
pro vyhledávání: '"PAI, MALLESH M."'
The current Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) equilibrium has several builders with different backgrounds winning blocks consistently. This paper considers how that equilibrium will shift when transactions are sold privately via order flow auctions (
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.19150
The classic wisdom-of-the-crowd problem asks how a principal can "aggregate" information about the unknown state of the world from agents without understanding the information structure among them. We propose a new simple procedure called Population-
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2102.02666
We present a general, efficient technique for providing contextual predictions that are "multivalid" in various senses, against an online sequence of adversarially chosen examples $(x,y)$. This means that the resulting estimates correctly predict var
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2101.01739
We show how to achieve the notion of "multicalibration" from H\'ebert-Johnson et al. [2018] not just for means, but also for variances and other higher moments. Informally, it means that we can find regression functions which, given a data point, can
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2008.08037
Autor:
Jung, Christopher, Kannan, Sampath, Lee, Changhwa, Pai, Mallesh M., Roth, Aaron, Vohra, Rakesh
There is increasing regulatory interest in whether machine learning algorithms deployed in consequential domains (e.g. in criminal justice) treat different demographic groups "fairly." However, there are several proposed notions of fairness, typicall
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2002.07147
Different agents need to make a prediction. They observe identical data, but have different models: they predict using different explanatory variables. We study which agent believes they have the best predictive ability -- as measured by the smallest
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.03809
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Theory April 2022 201
A mediator is a mechanism that can only suggest actions to players, as a function of all agents' reported types, in a given game of incomplete information. We study what is achievable by two kinds of mediators, "strong" and "weak." Players can choose
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1512.02698
We study how privacy technologies affect user and advertiser behavior in a simple economic model of targeted advertising. In our model, a consumer first decides whether or not to buy a good, and then an advertiser chooses an advertisement to show the
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.03080
We study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems that show that when the signals observed by the players satisfy a condition known as $(\epsilon, \gamma)$-differential privacy, that the folk
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1402.2801