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pro vyhledávání: '"Pérez Bejarano, Diego Mauricio"'
Publikováno v:
Akbar, P., & Duranton, G. (2017). Measuring the cost of congestion in highly congested city: Bogot ́a. Research Department working papers
Arrow, K. J., & Debreu, G. (1954). Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive econ-omy. Econometrica, 22 (3), 265–290.
Bocarejo, J. P., Portilla, I., & P ́erez, M. A. (2013). Impact of transmilenio on density, land use, and land value in bogot ́a. Research in Transportation Economics, 40 (1), 78–86.
Bogot ́a’s rise and fall. (2011, Mar). The Economist .
Bolton, P., & Dewatripont, M. (2004). Contract theory. MIT Press.
Echeverry, J. C., Ibanez, A. M., Moya, A., Hillon, L. C., C ́ardenas, M., & G ́omez-Lobo, A. (2005). The economics of transmilenio, a mass transit system for bogot ́a [with comments]. Econom ́ıa, 5 (2), 151–196.
Eric, M., John, R., Eric, M., & John, R. (1984). Monopoly with incomplete information. The RAND Journal of Economics, 15 (2), 171-196.
Gagnepain, P., Ivaldi, M., & Martimort, D. (2009). Ren ́egociation de contrats dans l’industrie du transport urbain en france. Revue ́economique, 60 (4), 927–947
Grossman, Oliver D., H., & J., S. (1983). An analysis of the principal-agent prob-lem. Econometrica, 51 (1), 7-45.
Holmstrom, & Bengt. (1982). Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (2), 324-340.
Laffont, J.-J., & Martimort, D. (2002). The theory of incentives: The principal-agent model. Princeton University Press.
Lleras, G. C. (2003). Bus rapid transit: impacts on travel behavior in bogot ́a (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mirrlees, & A., J. (1976). The optimal structure of incentives and authority within an organization. The Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (1), 105-131.
Monsalve, S. (2018). Competencia bajo equilibrio de nash (1st ed.). Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory, 18 (2), 301-317.
Pachon, A. (2016). Las concesiones de transmilenio y sitp vs. los derechos de acceso al transporte público: una perspectiva desde el análisis económico del derecho. Grupo Editorial Ibáñez.
The troubles of bogot ́a’s transmilenio. (2020, Jan). The Economist
Tsivanidis, N. (2018). The aggregate and distributional effects of urban transit infrastructure: Evidence from bogot ́a’s transmilenio. Job Market Paper
William, R. (2003). Simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement and regulation. The American Economic Review, 93 (3), 919.
Repositorio EdocUR-U. Rosario
Universidad del Rosario
instacron:Universidad del Rosario
Arrow, K. J., & Debreu, G. (1954). Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive econ-omy. Econometrica, 22 (3), 265–290.
Bocarejo, J. P., Portilla, I., & P ́erez, M. A. (2013). Impact of transmilenio on density, land use, and land value in bogot ́a. Research in Transportation Economics, 40 (1), 78–86.
Bogot ́a’s rise and fall. (2011, Mar). The Economist .
Bolton, P., & Dewatripont, M. (2004). Contract theory. MIT Press.
Echeverry, J. C., Ibanez, A. M., Moya, A., Hillon, L. C., C ́ardenas, M., & G ́omez-Lobo, A. (2005). The economics of transmilenio, a mass transit system for bogot ́a [with comments]. Econom ́ıa, 5 (2), 151–196.
Eric, M., John, R., Eric, M., & John, R. (1984). Monopoly with incomplete information. The RAND Journal of Economics, 15 (2), 171-196.
Gagnepain, P., Ivaldi, M., & Martimort, D. (2009). Ren ́egociation de contrats dans l’industrie du transport urbain en france. Revue ́economique, 60 (4), 927–947
Grossman, Oliver D., H., & J., S. (1983). An analysis of the principal-agent prob-lem. Econometrica, 51 (1), 7-45.
Holmstrom, & Bengt. (1982). Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (2), 324-340.
Laffont, J.-J., & Martimort, D. (2002). The theory of incentives: The principal-agent model. Princeton University Press.
Lleras, G. C. (2003). Bus rapid transit: impacts on travel behavior in bogot ́a (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mirrlees, & A., J. (1976). The optimal structure of incentives and authority within an organization. The Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (1), 105-131.
Monsalve, S. (2018). Competencia bajo equilibrio de nash (1st ed.). Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory, 18 (2), 301-317.
Pachon, A. (2016). Las concesiones de transmilenio y sitp vs. los derechos de acceso al transporte público: una perspectiva desde el análisis económico del derecho. Grupo Editorial Ibáñez.
The troubles of bogot ́a’s transmilenio. (2020, Jan). The Economist
Tsivanidis, N. (2018). The aggregate and distributional effects of urban transit infrastructure: Evidence from bogot ́a’s transmilenio. Job Market Paper
William, R. (2003). Simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement and regulation. The American Economic Review, 93 (3), 919.
Repositorio EdocUR-U. Rosario
Universidad del Rosario
instacron:Universidad del Rosario
Este trabajo analiza el modelo contractual del transporte público en Bogotá a partir de los efectos del riesgo moral y la selección adversa. Se hace énfasis en las reglas de operación y cómo éstas pueden afectar la calidad del sistema. Se anal
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1f1707d75f03e87fb00596e66565f5a7
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/33740
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/33740
