Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 55
pro vyhledávání: '"Owen Arden"'
Publikováno v:
2022 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC).
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f097e6bd4f5132506e82359a15faaaac
https://doi.org/10.1109/icbc54727.2022.9805547
https://doi.org/10.1109/icbc54727.2022.9805547
Publikováno v:
RAID
To protect an Industrial Control System (ICS), defenders need to identify potential attacks on the system and then design mechanisms to prevent them. Unfortunately, identifying potential attack conditions is a time-consuming and error-prone process.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::adeaca465633dc47fd69529c203342d2
https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471864
https://doi.org/10.1145/3471621.3471864
Autor:
Owen Arden, Haofan Zheng
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 2021 International Symposium on Advanced Security on Software and Systems.
Remote attestation (RA) authenticates code running in trusted execution environments (TEEs), allowing trusted code to be deployed even on untrusted hosts. However, trust relationships established by one component in a distributed application may impa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::48a6516436ce820178585a143e329e2c
https://doi.org/10.1145/3457340.3458304
https://doi.org/10.1145/3457340.3458304
Publikováno v:
IEEE ICBC
Enclave applications that rely on blockchains for integrity and availability are vulnerable to eclipse attacks. In this paper, we present an approach for reliably detecting extended eclipse attacks, even when the adversary controls all network connec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::37bef7e77296f91bb2b3d4832440fd63
https://doi.org/10.1109/icbc51069.2021.9461081
https://doi.org/10.1109/icbc51069.2021.9461081
Publikováno v:
CSF
We present the Flow-Limited Authorization First-Order Logic (FLAFOL), a logic for reasoning about authorization decisions in the presence of information-flow policies. We formalize the FLAFOL proof system, characterize its proof-theoretic properties,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::238f54727b2708a1f1e1ec6fa7b0b180
http://arxiv.org/abs/2001.10630
http://arxiv.org/abs/2001.10630
Publikováno v:
Journal of Computer Security. 25:367-426
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ecec09a1dffb47fb6bfe6ec6dd968c89
https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-15805
https://doi.org/10.3233/jcs-15805
Publikováno v:
SoCC
Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols are designed to ensure correctness and eventual progress in the face of misbehaving nodes [1]. However, this does not prevent negative effects an adversary may have on performance: a faulty node may significan
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8b4f3b198723e05f3dcab35a0289668e
https://doi.org/10.1145/3357223.3365442
https://doi.org/10.1145/3357223.3365442
Publikováno v:
CSF
Distributed applications cannot assume that their security policies will be enforced on untrusted hosts. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) combined with cryptographic mechanisms enable execution of known code on an untrusted host and the exchange
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::85c39310fe55f8a8ca3652e803bd4e48
https://doi.org/10.1109/csf.2019.00028
https://doi.org/10.1109/csf.2019.00028
Publikováno v:
Foundations of Security, Protocols, and Equational Reasoning ISBN: 9783030190514
Foundations of Security, Protocols, and Equational Reasoning
Foundations of Security, Protocols, and Equational Reasoning
Supported in part by AFOSR grants F9550-06-0019 and FA9550-11-1-0137, National Science Foundation grants 0430161, 0964409, and CCF-0424422 (TRUST), ONR grants N00014-01- 1-0968 and N00014-09-1-0652, and grants from Microsoft.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::278cbe427850d151a93aea53260eb4d8
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19052-1_7
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-19052-1_7
Publikováno v:
CCS
Noninterference is a popular semantic security condition because it offers strong end-to-end guarantees, it is inherently compositional, and it can be enforced using a simple security type system. Unfortunately, it is too restrictive for real systems
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a66208f250708c95a6ec784b93145208
https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134054
https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134054