Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 39
pro vyhledávání: '"Olivier Tercieux"'
Autor:
Julien Combe, Victor Hiller, Olivier Tercieux, Benoît Audry, Jules Baudet, Géraldine Malaquin, François Kerbaul, Corinne Antoine, Marie-Alice Macher, Christian Jacquelinet, Olivier Bastien, Myriam Pastural
Publikováno v:
Néphrologie & Thérapeutique. 18:270-277
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::691cf46ba3e9fa66724d9789efb1de04
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nephro.2022.02.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nephro.2022.02.001
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 89:3154-3222
To assign teachers to schools, a modified version of the well-known deferred acceptance mechanism has been proposed in the literature and is used in practice. We show that this mechanism fails to be fair and efficient for both teachers and schools. W
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6857627dcc876f43dbc40fde23b127ad
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac002
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac002
Autor:
Yeon-Koo Che, Olivier Tercieux
Publikováno v:
EC
We study the optimal design of a queueing system when agents' arrival and servicing are governed by a general Markov process. The designer of the system chooses entry and exit rules for agents, their service priority---or queueing discipline---as wel
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e0d409144c4d8966dd11815c49713984
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ae9029be1c90b27155b2bf49bb20b3b4
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4309000
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4309000
Publikováno v:
Administration & Éducation. :91-101
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9626ff1818e77c0f1c8bbef8b899537d
https://doi.org/10.3917/admed.163.0091
https://doi.org/10.3917/admed.163.0091
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents. Time is discrete and horizon finite. Agents are in the market from the first date and, at each date, have to be assigned items (or bundles of item
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5a3cfaace8fe054070a43043d62d5d06
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3894259
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3894259
Autor:
Satoru Takahashi, Olivier Tercieux
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2020, 188, ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2020.105068⟩
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2020, 188, ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2020.105068⟩
International audience; We analyze the robustness of equilibria in sequential games when there is almost common certainty of payoffs. We show that a generic extensive-form game may have no robust equilibrium behavior, but has at least one robust equi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::363d1ec723d2dec3b1c89fdb5449fe13
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02875199
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02875199
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review: Insights
American Economic Review: Insights, 2020, 2 (4), pp.425-441. ⟨10.1257/aeri.20190307⟩
American Economic Review: Insights, 2020, 2 (4), pp.425-441. ⟨10.1257/aeri.20190307⟩
Top trading cycles (TTC) is Pareto efficient and strategy-proof in priority-based matching, but so are other mechanisms including serial dictatorship. We show that TTC minimizes justified envy among all Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::65f2fe6c79e282c344862fe8192ce25b
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03029897
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03029897
Autor:
Yeon-Koo Che, Olivier Tercieux
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 13:239-271
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We provide a broad set of circ
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a4833aef23c7f4096d00c2015b83c9c6
https://doi.org/10.3982/te2793
https://doi.org/10.3982/te2793
Autor:
Olivier Tercieux, Yeon-Koo Che
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, 2019, 127 (5), pp.2301-2342. ⟨10.1086/701791⟩
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, 2019, 127 (5), pp.2301-2342. ⟨10.1086/701791⟩
International audience; We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We pro
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::24762ac6b978f770cc6bea2f071a25ab
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02087847
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02087847