Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 219
pro vyhledávání: '"Olivier Compte"'
Autor:
Olivier Compte
In dynamic environments, Q-learning is an adaptative rule that provides an estimate (a Q-value) of the continuation value associated with each alternative. A naive policy consists in always choosing the alternative with highest Q-value. We consider a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b9253987e8bbd61d9b482083207e3573
Autor:
Abhijit V. Banerjee, Olivier Compte
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ceb90cb3c908aad6c02d18e3e3261b46
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4074281
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4074281
Autor:
Olivier Compte, Andrew Postlewaite
Publikováno v:
Cambridge University Press, 298 p., 2018
Cambridge University Press, 298 p., 2019
Cambridge University Press, 298 p., 2019
Born of a belief that economic insights should not require much mathematical sophistication, this book proposes novel and parsimonious methods to incorporate ignorance and uncertainty into economic modeling, without complex mathematics. Economics has
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e4379a2ef6f33a5518054b0daf7134bc
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02103172
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02103172
Publikováno v:
Revue Economique
Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2017, 68, pp.141-162. ⟨10.3917/reco.pr2.0075⟩
Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2017, 68, pp.141-162
Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2017, 68, pp.141-162. ⟨10.3917/reco.pr2.0075⟩
Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2017, 68, pp.141-162
International audience; On considère des marchés pouvant faire l’objet d’un allotissement : les biens peuvent être découpés en lots plus ou moins hétérogènes. On s’intéresse à la question de l’allotissement optimal, du point de vue
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4ae786d73bdd601261255190c2c28c65
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01509658
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01509658
Autor:
Olivier Compte, Philippe Jehiel
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2009, 1 (1), pp.182-206. ⟨10.1257/mic.1.1.182⟩
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2009, 1 (1), pp.182-206. ⟨10.1257/mic.1.1.182⟩
We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options, the size of the pie is commonly known and each party privately knows the realization of her outside option. We allow for correlations in the distributions of outside opt
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fce27f3416a5a5f484392a665de6497e
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.1.1.182
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.1.1.182
Autor:
Olivier Compte, Philippe Jehiel
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, 2008, 26 (1), pp.206-212. ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.002⟩
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, 2008, 26 (1), pp.206-212. ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.002⟩
A principal has to choose among several agents to fulfill a task and then provide the right incentives to perform it. Agents do not a priori know how competent they are for the task. It is shown that the principal should propose a contract that leads
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ec76b877a9d071eb220c22aa10ba5c75
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.11.002
Autor:
Olivier Compte, Philippe Jehiel
Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Studies. 71:975-1000
This paper identifies a source of gradualism in bargaining and contribution games. In the bargaining games we examine, each party can opt out at any time, and the outside option outcome is assumed to depend on the offers made in the negotiation phase
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f22870ec0f5afd669fb685df80f54dde
https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00311
https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00311
Autor:
Philippe Jehiel, Olivier Compte
Publikováno v:
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, 2 (2-3) pp. 494-503. (2004)
Ascending auctions offer agents the option to wait and see before deciding to drop out. We show that in contexts where as time proceeds agents get finer and finer estimates of their valuations, incentives to drop out at one’s expected valuation are
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::686adb0e97341eac573ddf35a47e0288
https://doi.org/10.1162/154247604323068177
https://doi.org/10.1162/154247604323068177
Autor:
Olivier Compte, Philippe Jehiel
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 112:334-342
We revisit Admati and Perry (1991)'s model of voluntary contributions to a joint project. Their main result that equilibrium contributions are small appears not to be robust to the introduction of asymmetries.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::06b1aad025b548552aaddb6745c09da7
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00103-0
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00103-0