Zobrazeno 1 - 7
of 7
pro vyhledávání: '"Ofir Weisse"'
Autor:
Barret Rhoden, Neel Natu, Ofir Weisse, Luigi Rizzo, Paul Turner, Josh Don, Christos Kozyrakis, Ashwin Chaugule, Oleg Rombakh, Jack Tigar Humphries
Publikováno v:
SOSP
We present ghOSt, our infrastructure for delegating kernel scheduling decisions to userspace code. ghOSt is designed to support the rapidly evolving needs of our data center workloads and platforms. Improving scheduling decisions can drastically impr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::978f193dc2562c04393519a986cd8956
https://doi.org/10.1145/3477132.3483542
https://doi.org/10.1145/3477132.3483542
Autor:
Jo Van Bulck, Thomas F. Wenisch, Baris Kasikci, Ofir Weisse, Mark Silberstein, Yuval Yarom, Marina Minkin, Raoul Strackx, Daniel Genkin, Frank Piessens
Publikováno v:
IEEE Micro. 39:66-74
Foreshadow is a speculative execution attack that allows adversaries to subvert the security guarantees of Intel's Software Guard eXtensions (SGX). Foreshadow allows access to data across process boundaries, and allows virtual machines (VMs) to read
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::aa65b0bb9f1efcde0c30dddca544dcf4
https://doi.org/10.1109/mm.2019.2910104
https://doi.org/10.1109/mm.2019.2910104
Publikováno v:
MICRO
Speculative execution attacks like Meltdown and Spectre work by accessing secret data in wrong-path execution. Secrets are then transmitted and recovered by the attacker via a covert channel. Existing mitigations either require code modifications, ad
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::271eaf959c61603dd5175e523a37a105
https://doi.org/10.1145/3352460.3358306
https://doi.org/10.1145/3352460.3358306
Publikováno v:
ISCA
Intel's SGX secure execution technology allows running computations on secret data using untrusted servers. While recent work showed how to port applications and large-scale computations to run under SGX, the performance implications of using the tec
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f0bb1746f3e4fa729897d632c05911c3
https://doi.org/10.1145/3079856.3080208
https://doi.org/10.1145/3079856.3080208
Publikováno v:
EuroS&P
Cyber-physical systems depend on sensors to make automated decisions. Resonant acoustic injection attacks are already known to cause malfunctions by disabling MEMS-based gyroscopes. However, an open question remains on how to move beyond denial of se
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a669312d059e5082e446bff9d9572834
https://doi.org/10.1109/eurosp.2017.42
https://doi.org/10.1109/eurosp.2017.42
Publikováno v:
Advanced Information Systems Engineering ISBN: 9783642387081
CHES
CHES
The use of constraint solvers, such as SAT- or Pseudo-Boolean-solvers, allows the extraction of the secret key from one or two side-channel traces. However, to use such a solver the cipher must be represented at bit-level. For byte-oriented ciphers t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::289ecd5c802d071ba4e0bcfa23439edc
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44709-3_2
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44709-3_2
Publikováno v:
HASP@ISCA
Scopus-Elsevier
Scopus-Elsevier
Template-based Tolerant Algebraic Side Channel Attacks (Template-TASCA) were suggested in [20] as a way of reducing the high data complexity of template attacks by coupling them with algebraic side-channel attacks. In contrast to the maximum-likeliho
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::72c35bbcba351149cce3b3ee823c69b8
https://doi.org/10.1145/2487726.2487733
https://doi.org/10.1145/2487726.2487733