Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 17
pro vyhledávání: '"Odile Poulsen"'
Publikováno v:
Luhan, W, Poulsen, O & Roos, M W M 2019, ' Money or morality: fairness ideals in unstructured bargaining ', Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53, no. 4, 0, pp. 655-675 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01206-5
We augment the Nash bargaining solution by fairness ideals in order to predict the outcomes of unstructured bargaining after the individual production of a joint surplus. If production depends on individual effort, talent, and luck, fairness ideals m
Autor:
Odile Poulsen, Krista Jabs Saral
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 164:75-78
Are people better at coordinating on a focal point when the game is framed as coordinating on a division of losses rather than gains? In an experimental coordination game, we vary the payoff framing (gain vs loss) and stake size (low vs high) to exam
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 48:659-678
We assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task
Autor:
Anders Frederiksen, Odile Poulsen
Publikováno v:
Economic Inquiry. 54:1224-1239
During the last three decades, most developed countries have experienced increasing income inequality. Using Danish register data from 1992 to 2007 for all private-sector employees, we confirm that income inequality has increased in Denmark. We also
Autor:
Odile Poulsen, Melanie Parravano
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 94:191-199
We collect data from symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with a focal point and vary the stake size. The data show that in symmetric games coordination on the label-salient strategy increases with stake size. By contrast, in asymmetric games
We experimentally investigate if subjects in a tacit coordination situation with a conflict of interest tend to choose an equal compromise, even if it is strictly dominated. The data show that this is the case, as long as the compromise payoffs are n
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bde7ab42c3d1f6e50ed03c225fe45955
https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/56330/
https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/56330/
Autor:
Odile Poulsen, Anders Poulsen
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Socio-Economics. 39:158-162
We analyse the evolutionary stability of a preference for reciprocity in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. A distingushing and, as we argue, plausible, feature of the analysis is that reciprocal players are not assumed to be able to coordinate on mutual coop
Autor:
Anders Poulsen, Odile Poulsen
Publikováno v:
Economics Bulletin. 3(74):1-8
In this note we analyze the viability of a commitment strategy when there are errors in communication. We consider an entry deterrence game where with a certain probability the Incumbent's decision is either perfectly observed by the Potential Intrud
Autor:
Aditya Goenka, Odile Poulsen
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics. 86:143-166
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 21:175-183
This article considers a two-sector model of economic growth with “labour-augmenting” intersectoral external effects stemming from the aggregate capital stock. It is shown that equilibrium balanced growth paths with a non-trivial labour allocatio